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COMMENTS 
MARYLAND STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 
REMEDIES FOR MISREPRESENTATION IN 
SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 
Victims of misrepresentation in securities transactions generally 
bring their claims into federal court under Rule 10b-5. Because 
some courts have constricted the scope of this federal remedy, 
other means of relief for misrepresentation have assumed 
greater importance. This comment explores Maryland's statu-
tory and common law remedies and discusses certain advantages 
available through these avenues of relief. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current popularity of federal remedies for securities fraud 
may sometimes lead litigants to ignore state relief. Inattention to state 
remedies may cause the loss of valuable opportunities for redress in 
either state court or, on the basis of pendent jurisdiction, federal court. 
Because federal courts have begun to narrow the reach of an implied 
remedy under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-
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5, I state remedies for securities fraud are acquiring greater importance. 
Common law theories that antedate both the federal and state securi-
ties statutes retain their vitality in modem securities litigation, and the 
private remedies approach offered by the Maryland Securities Ace 
(Act) is sufficiently distinct from Rule lOb-5 to warrant its use as a 
separate, rather than concurrent, avenue of redress. This article de-
scribes the remedies available under Maryland common law and the 
Act, and compares the state and federal securities laws to demonstrate 
their important differences. 
II. MARYLAND COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR 
SECURITIES FRAUD 
Maryland courts allowed recovery for misrepresentations in secur-
ities transactions well before the adoption of the state and federal se-
curities acts. These common law theories deal with both affirmative 
and negligent misrepresentations. The following will discuss signifi-
cant elements of each cause of action to provide background for a sub-
sequent comparison of the state and federal acts. 
A. Actions in .Deceit 
Although Maryland decisional law occasionally mentions actions 
for fraud,3 "fraud" and "deceit" are synonymous terms, and the ele-
ments for any cause of action labeled fraud are identical to those for 
the traditional deceit action.4 Deceit actions have consistently provided 
a vehicle for recovery under theories of law5 and equity6 for affirmative 
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983). Rule IOb-5 was issued under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.c. § 78j(b) (1982). For a thorough discussion of the 
growing trend of the federal courts to limit the reach of Rule IOb-5, see I A. 
BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD 
§ 2.2(463) (1983) (reviewing the "contraction era" of Rule IOb-5). 
2. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § ll-IOI to -908 (1975 & Supp. 1984). 
3. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of S. Md. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 275 
Md. 400, 409, 340 A.2d 275, 283 (1975) (alleged fraudulent assignment of accounts 
to a third party); Buschman v. Codd, 52 Md. 202, 206 (1879) (action in fraud for 
misrepresentations that induced purchase of interest in business). 
4. Compare Suburban Properties Management, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460, 
204 A.2d 326, 329 (1964) (listing elements of "legal fraud") with Appel v. 
Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 378, 84 A.2d 94,95-96 (1951) (listing same elements for an 
"action in deceit"). This comment will refer to all actions in deceit and fraud as 
actions in deceit. 
5. See, e.g., Cook v. Gill, 83 Md. 177,34 A. 248 (1896) (damages awarded for fraud-
ulent misrepresentations that induced purchase of mining shares); McAleer v. 
Horsey, 35 Md. 439 (1872) (damages recovered for fraudulently induced purchase 
of shares in a silver mine). 
6. See, e.g., Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 212 A.2d 476 (1965) (rescission of 
contract for purchase of controlling shares in corporation granted because of ma-
terial misrepresentations made by the seller); Findlay v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. 
Co., 97 Md. 716, 55 A. 379 (1903) (presence of fraud in the sale of bonds will 
allow rescission of the contract to purchase); Fear v. Bartlett, 81 Md. 435, 32 A. 
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misrepresentations in the sale or purchase of securities.7 
1. Affirmative Misrepresentation 
Many torts include affirmative misrepresentation as an integral el-
ement.s An action in deceit, however, is a separate tort that addresses 
affirmative misrepresentation as a distinct wrongful action.9 The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland first applied the theory of deceit to a typical 
securities transaction in McAleer v. Horsey,1O an 1872 decision. In 
McAleer, the defrauded purchaser of shares in a valueless Nevada sil-
ver mine successfully claimed damages caused by the seller's misrepre-
sentations that induced the purchase. The court of appeals 
subsequently developed and refined five elements for an action in de-
ceit: (1) speaker made a false representation; (2) speaker knew that the 
representation was false, or made it with such reckless indifference to 
the truth so as to impute his knowledge; (3) this misrepresentation was 
made for the purpose of defrauding another; (4) recipient relied, and 
had a right to rely, upon the speaker's misrepresentation; and (5) recipi-
ent suffered damage as a direct result of the misrepresentation. II 
Prior to examining the elements of deceit, it should be noted that a 
plaintiff may obtain recovery under this theory only by proving that the 
alleged misrepresentation is the proximate cause of his damages. 
Courts analyze each of the deceit elements to determine if the alleged 
misrepresentation should have been, and was in fact, reasonably relied 
322 (1895) (defense of fraud available in equity to defeat action for unpaid bal-
ance of stock subscription when its purchase was fraudulently induced). 
7. See, e.g., Byrd v. Rautman, 85 Md. 414, 417-19,36 A. 1099, 1100 (1897) (court 
recognized but did not grant right to cause of action by defrauded seller of corpo-
rate shares); McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439 (1872) (remedy available for de-
frauded buyer of valueless mining corporation shares). 
The continuing vitality of common law remedies for fraudulent securities 
transactions is demonstrated by a 1983 decision by the court of special appeals. 
Kalb v. Vega, 56 Md. App. 653, 468 A.2d 676 (1983) (seller of corporate shares, 
defrauded by purchaser's misstatements and omissions of fact, awarded damages 
for fraudulent conversion). 
8. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971) (misrep-
resentation of authority can be an element in an action for false imprisonment; 
misrepresentation that a dangerous substance is wholesome food may form an 
element of an action for battery; misrepresentation of identity or purpose may 
become an element in an action for conversion). 
9. For a thorough discussion of the historical development of the action of deceit, see 
id.; see also Comment, Deceit and Negligent Misrepresentation in Maryland, 35 
MD. L. REV. 651, 651-61 (1976). 
10. 35 Md. 439 (1872). Maryland decisional law on fraud in transactions not involv-
ing traditional securities may be traced to Joice v. Taylor, 6 G. & J. 54 (Md. 1833) 
(rescission granted on mortgage that was fraudulently obtained). 
II. Suburban Properties Management, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460, 204 A.2d 
326,329 (1964) (citing Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 84 A.2d 94 (1951», cited in 
First Nat'l Bank of S. Md. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 275 Md. 400, 
411-12, 340 A.2d 275, 284 (1975); Canatella v. Davis, 264 Md. 190, 198-99, 286 
A.2d 122, 126-27 (1972); James v. Goldberg, 256 Md. 520, 528-29, 261 A.2d 753, 
758 (1970). 
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upon by the plaintiff to his detriment. 12 Many cases after McAleer that 
involved securities transactions focused upon each of these elements. 13 
Maryland courts will not sustain an action for deceit unless the 
affirmative misrepresentation concerns an ascertainable fact. For ex-
ample, in Buschman v. Codd,14 the court of appeals focused upon 
whether a seller's statements regarding the soundness and profitability 
of the business he had sold to the defrauded purchaser constituted mis-
representations upon which a buyer might reasonably rely. The court 
held that an actionable misrepresentation could only be premised upon 
a statement of "ascertainable fact," and not upon an opinion, judg-
ment, expectation or anything so indefinite that it should put the one 
hearing it upon inquiry. IS Since the Buschman decision dealt with rep-
resentations that were "peculiarly" within the knowledge of the seller, 16 
and the purchaser had no other means of determining the truth of the 
representations, the court found the statements to be material facts 
upon which the buyer had a right to relyY 
Maryland decisional law fails to define explicitly what constitutes 
an ascertainable fact. IS Generally, the representation must "be of a 
12. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 108, at 714-20. 
13. For an overview of the development of Maryland decisional law on fraud in se-
curities transactions and topics relating to corporate subjects, see Shulton, Inc. v. 
Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 212 A.2d 476 (1965) (misrepresentations of stock value and 
perfection of chemical production method to induce sale); Schmidt v. Millhauser, 
212 Md. 585, 130 A.2d 572 (1956) (advertisement for sale of apartment complex 
induced purchase through misrepresentation); Sears v. Barker, 155 Md. 323, 141 
A. 908 (1928) (allegations that misrepresentations in oil company prospectus in-
duced purchase of shares); Reynolds v. Evans, 123 Md. 365, 912 A. 564 (1914) 
(allegations that misrepresentations induced purchase of stock); Kalb v. Vega, 56 
Md. App. 653, 468 A.2d 676 (1983) (purchaser's nondisclosures and misstatements 
regarding the true financial condition of the corporation constituted fraudulent 
misrepresentations; damages awarded to defrauded seller of shares). 
14. 52 Md. 202 (1879). 
15. The Buschman court stated: 
The representation to be material, must be in respect of an ascertainable 
fact as distinguishable from a mere matter of opinion. A representation 
which amounts to a statement of opinion, judgment or expectation, or is 
vague and indefinite in its nature and terms, or is merely a loose conjec-
tural or exaggerated statement, is not sufficient to support an action. 
And for the reason, that such indefinite representations ought to put the 
person to whom they are made, upon the inquiry, and if he chooses to 
put faith in such statements, and abstracted from inquiry, he has no rea-
son to complain. 
Id. at 207; accord Lewis v. Clark, 86 Md. 327, 37 A. 1035 (1897) (mere statements 
that previous owner informed seller that water supplied by cistern was good in 
quality and quantity did not provide a basis for injured buyer who did not further 
investigate the water supply). 
16. Buschman, 52 Md. at 208. 
17. Id. at 208-09. 
18. See Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 578, 185 A.2d 344, 349 (1962); Schnader v. 
Brooks, 150 Md. 52, 132 A. 381 (1926); Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 60 A. 
609 (1905). 
578 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 13 
past or existing fact,"19 or a promise to perform,20 which is definite and 
not merely vague or general. An actionable false representation, in its 
broadest sense, may include anything short of a warranty that creates a 
false impression conducive to some act.21 Maryland cases discussing 
securities fraud indicate that actionable facts include the specific value 
of shares;22 that another person is already a shareholder in the corpora-
tion;23 that certain persons have agreed to become directors;24 and cer-
tain statements contained in a prospectus.25 Other actionable 
misrepresentations have been based upon misstatements of business 
costs;26 the solvency of a business;27 hidden encumbrances upon corpo-
rate assets;28 that stock is authorized29 or genuine;30 that shares could 
not be purchased for less than a specific amount;31 and promises to 
perform,32 Nonactionable misrepresentations have included the moti-
vation for selling shares;33 mere opinions regarding stock value;34 that a 
19. See Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 578-79, 185 A.2d 344, 349 (1962). 
20. See Tufts v. Poore, 219 Md. I, 1I-l2, 147 A.2d 717, 723 (1959) (fraud may be 
founded upon promises made with no intention to perform). Contra Appel v. 
Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 399, 84 A.2d 94, 96 (1951) (cannot ordinarily predicate 
fraud upon promissory statements). 
21. Fowler v. Benton, 299 Md. 571,579, 185 A.2d 344,349 (1962); see a/so Local 75 
United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Regiec, 19 Md. App. 406, 410, 31I A.2d 456, 
458 (1973) (court noted that another case, Johnson v. Maryland Trust Co., 176 
Md. 557, 6 A.2d 383 (1939), was an "equity action which held that misrepresenta-
tions giving rise to relief in equity must relate to matters of fact and not to matters 
of expectations or opinions."). 
22. Cook v. Gill, 83 Md. 177, 187-90,34 A. 248, 249-50 (1896) (statements regarding 
value of stock may present legally sufficient evidence of misrepresentations). 
23. Wenstrom Consol. Dynamo & Motor Co. v. Purnell, 75 Md. 113, 122,23 A. 134, 
134-36 (1891) (applies to equity actions to avoid contracts of subscription or sale 
where one party was bound by fraudulent inducements). 
24.ld 
25. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Millhauser, 212 Md. 585, 588, 130 A.2d 572, 573 (1956) (ad-
vertisement represented apartment roof 25 to 30 years old as "recently installed"); 
Sears v. Barker, 155 Md. 323, 325-26, 141 A. 908, 909 (1928) (statements in pro-
spectus that oil corporation owned certain property when corporation actually 
held an option); Findlay v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. Co., 97 Md. 716, 718-21, 55 
A. 379, 380-81 (1903) (complaint withstood demurrer when, among other repre-
sentations, statements in prospectus indicated that the offered securities had been 
carefully investigated and were very safe). 
26. Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 685, 212 A.2d 476, 485 (1965) (statements of 
fact regarding cost to purchase controlling shares may be considered material 
misrepresentations). 
27. James Clark Co. v. Colton, 91 Md. 195,204,46 A. 386, 391-92 (1900). 
28. McGaw v. Hoen, 133 Md. 672, 680, 106 A. 13, 16 (1919). 
29. Tome v. Parkersburg Branch R.R., 39 Md. 36 (1873). 
30. Western Md. R.R. v. Franklin Bank, 60 Md. 36 (1883). 
31. Cook v. Gill, 83 Md. 177, 188-91,34 A. 248, 249-50 (1896). 
32. See supra note 20. 
33. Byrd v. Rautman, 85 Md. 414, 419, 36 A. 1099, llOl (1897). 
34. Compare Reynolds v. Evans, 123 Md. 365, 370-71,91 A. 564, 566-67 (1914) (gen-
eral assertions by seller that property is valuable are not statements of existing 
fact, but only a nonactionable opinion) with Cook v. Gill, 83 Md. 177, 186-88,34 
A. 248, 249 (1896) (statement that "eighty dollars is the price everybody paid" for 
stock was an actionable fact). 
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business was failing and that a shareholder-officer would be dis-
charged;35 that the purchasers of stock intended to resell for a profit;36 
representations regarding the true ownership of stock being sold;37 and 
statements that a business is "pros~erous and well-established"38 and a 
"safe and profitable investment."3 
Once the plaintiff establishes the misrepresentation of an ascer-
tainable fact, he must show that it was material to the transaction and 
that he relied upon it. A statement is material if without it,40 or if it 
were known that the statement was untrue,41 the defrauded party 
would not have completed the transaction. In addition, materiality 
may be found when a contract clause designates certain misrepresenta-
tions as materia1.42 An objective standard is applied to determine the 
materiality of a misrepresentation. Under this standard, the question is 
whether a reasonable investor would have relied upon the misrepresen-
tation in making the investment decision.43 
The issue of reliance is closely related to materiality. A finding 
that a misrepresentation is material because a transaction would not 
have been completed without it implies reliance upon the statement. 
To determine whether a party relied upon the material misrepresenta-
tion, however, a subjective test is applied. In this situation, the issue is 
35. Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 555-56, 60 A. 609, 612 (1905) (statements made 
to induce plaintiff to sell his shares were deemed mere "buyers talk" rather than 
misrepresentations of facts; court applied rule of caveat vendor). 
36. Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, 187 Md. 49, 59-60, 48 A.2d 322, 327-28 (1946). 
37. Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 505, 56 A. 794, 798 (1904). 
38. Robertson v. Parks, 76 Md. 118, 127,24 A. 411, 413 (1892) (statements of opinion 
of speculative belief are not ascertainable facts and place recipient upon inquiry 
notice). 
39. Id at 127, 132-33,24 A. at 413-14. 
40. Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 552, 60 A. 609, 610 (1905) ("The fraud must be 
material, by which is meant that without it, the transaction would not have been 
made."); see also Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 578-83, 185 A.2d 344, 349-51 
(1962) (discussing actionable misrepresentaions). See generally Annot., 80 
A.L.R.3d 13 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (review of cases discussing materiality). 
41. See Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 685, 212 A.2d 476, 485 (1965); Byrd v. 
Rautman, 85 Md. 414, 416, 36 A. 1099, 1100 (1897). 
42. See Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 686, 212 A.2d 476,485 (1965). 
43. The court of appeals, in a 1950 decision, remarked: 
[R]eliance upon either a fraudulent or an innocent misrepresentation of 
fact in a business transaction is justifiable only if the fact misrepresented 
is material. A fact is material if (I) its existence or nonexistence is a 
matter to which a reasonable man would attach importance in determin-
ing his choice of action in the transaction, or (2) the maker of the repre-
sentation knows that its recipient is likely to regard the fact as important 
although a reasonable man would not so regard it. 
Brodsky v. Hull, 196 Md. 509, 515-16, 77 A.2d 156, 159 (1950) (citing Clark v. 
Kirsner, 196 Md. 52, 74 A.2d 830 (1950); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538 (1934»; 
see also W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 108, at 714-20 (discussing interplay between 
the theories of reliance and materiality in actions for deceit); if. Clark, 196 Md. at 
56, 74 A.2d at 832 (materiality more important in proceeding for rescission than 
in case of fraudulent misrepresentation) (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
§ 476 comment b (1932». 
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not whether "a reasonable investor would" consider the representation 
important, but whether this investor considered the false statement im-
portant when making his decision.44 
A close factual and legal nexus exists between the concepts of ma-
teriality and reliance. Essentially the same facts are analyzed to deter-
mine whether the defrauded party should have relied, and did rely, 
upon the misrepresentation. Materiality and reliance are both ex-
amined to establish the causation of the injury. Absent either element, 
as a matter of law the misrepresentation could not have been the proxi-
mate cause of the damages alleged. For example, a Maryland court 
will not analyze the issue of materiality if it finds that the plaintiff did 
not or could not have relied upon the asserted misrepresentation. For 
instance, in Negley v. Hagerstown Manufacturing, Mining & Land Im-
provement Co. ,45 the plaintiff claimed to have contracted to purchase 
certain shares solely upon misrepresentations set forth in the issuer's 
prospectus. The Negley court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the 
suit, noting that the uncontested facts demonstrated that the prospectus 
had not been published until three days after the plaintiff had 
purchased the shares. The court, which found reliance impossible in 
this situation, refused to entertain questions dealing with the material-
ity of the alleged misrepresentations.46 Materiality and the right to rely 
upon representations contained in a prospectus are normally presumed 
by Maryland courts unless a situation analogous to that in Negley is 
presented.47 Conversely, once a misrepresentation has been deemed 
44. See Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 689, 212 A.2d 476, 485 (1965) (plaintiff-
investor "would not have agreed" to invest if the truth of the misrepresentations 
had been known to him). 
45. 86 Md. 692, 39 A. 506 (1898). 
46. The Negley court remarked: 
It is morally certain that he could not have been induced by the state-
ments contained in that prospectus to make the subscription when, in 
point of fact, the prospectus had no existence at the time the subscription 
was made. And this is all we need to say. As thus presented the case does 
not call for an analysis of the statements contained in the prospectus. . . . 
ld. at 695, 39 A. at 507 (emphasis supplied). See generally James & Gray, Misrep-
resentation-Part 11, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 488-511 (1978) (reviewing historical 
development of the definition of justifiable reliance). 
47. The stringent duty of complete and accurate disclosures in a prospectus imposed 
by the Maryland courts is best seen from the following passage from an 1894 court 
of appeals decision: 
Those who issue a prospectus holding out to the public the great advan-
tages which will accrue to persons who will take shares in a proposed 
undertaking, and inviting them to take shares on the faith of the repre-
sentations therein contained, are bound to state everything with strict 
and scrupulous accuracy, and not only to abstain from stating as a fact 
that which is not so, but to omit no one fact within their knowledge, the 
existence of which might in any degree affect the nature, or extent, or 
quality of the privileges and advantages which the prospectus holds out 
as inducements to take shares. 
Findlay v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. Co., 97 Md. 716, 723, 55 A. 379, 381 (1903) 
(quoting Savage v. Bartlett, 78 Md. 561, 565, 28 A. 414, 415 (1894)). 
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immaterial, courts will find that the plaintiff had no right to rely upon it 
and they will deny recovery.48 
2. Fraudulent Omission 
Intentional omissions of material fact are actionable in deceit in 
the same manner as affirmative representations.49 The rationale for 
this approach is simply a recognition that "[flraud may consist in a 
suppression of the truth as well as in the assertion ofa falsehood."50 As 
in complaints alleging misrepresentations, courts must find intentional 
concealment of a fact for the purpose of defrauding the investor or 
seller.51 
Maryland courts draw a distinction, however, between intentional 
concealment of facts and mere non-disclosureP Without a showing of 
intentional concealment, there is no duty to disclose unrequested infor-
mation absent a special relationship imposing a higher duty of disclo-
sure between the parties.53 Examples of this relationship in securities 
transactions are those of the corporate officer to corporate share hold-
ers54 and creditors;55 between the corporation and others dealing with 
48. Babb v. Bolyard, 194 Md. 603, 61O-11, 72 A.2d 13, 17 (1950) (automobile dealer's 
misrepresentations were not material; therefore, the court would not discuss the 
issue of reasonable reliance by the plaintifl); see supra notes 38-39 and accompa-
nying text (because alleged misrepresentations were considered immaterial, the 
court found it unnecessary to evaluate the plainti1rs reliance). 
49. See supra note 47. 
50. Schnader v. Brooks, 150 Md. 52, 57, 132 A. 381, 383 (1926). In Findlay v. Balti-
more Trust & Guar. Co., 97 Md. 716, 55 A. 379 (1903), for example, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland found the allegation that the seller of streetcar bonds had 
"withheld and suppressed the material information as to the value and safety of 
the bonds as an investment" constituted an averment of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, through omission of facts from a prospectus, sufficient to withstand demur-
rer.ld at 722-23, 55 A. at 381; see also Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 685, 
212 A.2d 476, 487 (1965) (misrepresentations of material facts through misstate-
ments and omissions induced sale of corporate shares). 
51. Compare Findlay v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. Co., 97 Md. 716, 55 A. 379 (1903) 
(omissions of fact from prospectus support an action for fraudulent misrepresen-
tation) with Robertson v. Parks, 76 Md. 118, 133,24 A. 411, 413 (1892) (failure to 
observe statutory bookkeeping requirements, i.e., failure to maintain business 
records would not constitute substantive ground for recovery in action for deceit; 
court requires intentional suppression). 
52. See Schnader v. Brooks, 150 Md. 52, 58, 132 A. 381, 383 (1926) (noting distinction 
between suppression of fact and mere silence). These criteria apply only to ac-
tions in deceit forjraudulenf omissions; Maryland may also recognize an action in 
negligence based upon an omission. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
53. Schnader v. Brooks, 150 Md. 52, 58, 132 A. 381, 383 (1926) ("where there is an 
obligation to speak, a failure to speak will constitute the suppression of a fact; but 
where there is no obligation to speak, silence cannot be termed suppression") 
(quoting Chicora Fertilizer Co. v. Dunan, 91 Md. 144, 159,46 A. 347, 351 (1900». 
54. Parish v. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 74, 242 A.2d 512, 539 (1968) (officers 
and directors, because of their confidential relationship to the shareholders, owe a 
duty to reveal all facts material to the corporate transaction); Ross Trans., Inc. v. 
Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 583-85,45 A.2d 267, 271-72 (1946) (sale of authorized but 
unissued shares by corporate directors to themselves voidable as constructive 
582 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 13 
the corporation;56 or between partners. 57 When a relationship creates a 
duty to disclose, one party to the transaction occupies a position of trust 
and confidence, and possesses restricted or "inside" information. 
Omissions by those with access to this information may constitute a 
breach of trust or confidence if the concealment is intended to defraud 
those less informed. 58 
fraud upon the other shareholders; court applied principle that trustees cannot 
purchase at their own sale); Macgill v. Macgill, 135 Md. 384, 393-94, 109 A 72, 75 
(1919) (under theories of agency and trusteeship, failure to disclose facts underly-
ing ~llegedly "fraudulent" stock exchange promoted by corporate directors is a 
sufficient breach of duty to disallow a demurrer). But if. Twenty Seven Trust v. 
Realty Growth Investors & RGI Holding Co., 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (D. Md. 
1982) (federal case ap,plying Maryland law held controlling shareholders under no 
duty through a fiduclary relationship to minority shareholders regarding their 
stock, absent a claim of fraud or other wrongful conduct); Llewellyn v. Queen 
City Dairy, 187 Md. 49, 58-60, 48 A.2d 322, 327-28 (1946) (corporate director's 
failure to reveal inside information when buying stock from a shareholder would 
not be considered a breach of a fiduciary relationship, absent attempts to mislead 
or perpetrate a fraud); Kalb v. Vega, 56 Md. App. 653, 661-62, 468 A2d 676, 680-
81 (1983) (interpreting Llewellyn as standing for the proposition that corporate 
directors have no fiduciary relationship with individual shareholders, but direc-
tors are liable for fraudulent activities practiced upon individual shareholders). 
Llewellyn and Twenty Seven Trust may ignore that, but for the ownership of 
stock, no relationship would ever arise among shareholders and directors or 
among shareholders. The ownership of stock therefore arguably creates some de-
gree of relationship between corporate directors and shareholders, rather than 
equating shareholders with those who own no shares and are thus complete stran-
gers to the corporation. 
55. See James Clark Co. v. Colton, 91 Md. 195,209,46 A 386, 387-88 (1900) (in an 
action by the trustee in bankruptcy to declare certain transactions void as fraudu-
lent preferences, the court recognized superior knowledge of corporate affairs by a 
director and that this knowledge could not be used to further his own interests at 
the expense of others). 
56. See McGraw v. Hoen, 133 Md. 672, 680, 106 A 13, 16 (1919) (corporate officers 
under affirmative duty to disclose hidden encumbrances to purchasers of corpo-
rate assets); Tompkins v. Sperry, Jones & Co., 96 Md. 560, 582-83, 54 A. 254, 258 
(1903) (fiduciary relationship extends between corporation and those whom it in-
vites to enter into transactions and includes the duty "to practice no conceal-
ments"); Western Md. R.R. v. Franklin Bank, 60 Md. 36 (1883) (corporation 
liable for fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions by agent regarding genu-
ineness of stock certificates). 
57. See Hambleton v. Rhind, 84 Md. 456, 487-89, 36 A 597, 602 (1897) (partners 
under affirmative duty to disclose all material facts to copartners). 
58. See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 13 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (discussing when a 
duty to disclose material facts to stock purchasers arises); Annot., 22 AL.R.3d 793 
(1968) (discussing corporate insider's nondisclosure of information as a basis of 
liability under the federal securities acts). 
In addition, corporate officers individually must be aware of the need to 
avoid fraud because Maryland courts have demonstrated a willingness to pierce 
the corporate veil of personal non-liability to prevent fraud or enforce a para-
mount equity. See Colandrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 433, 401 A.2d 480, 
484 (court disregarded corporate entity because of fraudulent conduct of sole 
shareholder), cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979); Fuller v. Horvarth, 42 Md. App. 
671,684-87,402 A2d 134, 142-43 (1979) (fraud potentially existed and trial court 
could disregard corporate entity if it found fraud after remand of directed ver-
dict). For cases where fraud was not found but the court reiterated the theory, see 
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As in cases involving misrepresentations, an omission must be ma-
terial to provide a basis for recovery. Early Maryland cases held that in 
circumstances where a prospectus was issued59 or a relationship of spe-
cial trust existed,60 a party is under a duty to omit no facts upon which 
a reasonable investor might rely.61 This low threshold standard for re-
covery on omissions may constitute too high a duty to disclose, how-
ever, and could present situations where the most trivial omissions 
would premise an action in deceit.62 Maryland courts appear to have at 
least implicitly accepted instead the reasonable investor "would have 
relied" standard63 and will probably continue to use this standard be-
cause it is in substantial accordance with the prevailing standard in 
omission cases under federallaw.64 
3. Scienter 
Actions in deceit require scienter.65 To prove scienter, or fraudu-
lent intent, the defrauded party must demonstrate that the speaker 
knew the falsity of the statement he made, or was so reckless and indif-
ferent to the truth of the matter asserted that scienter may be imputed 
to him.66 Early Maryland cases often went to great lengths to distin-
guish where scienter-through-recklessness stopped and mere negligence 
began. One of the best examples of an effort to refine this distinction 
was provided in Cahill v. Applegarth, 67 a 1904 decision by the court of 
appeals. The CahIll court held that absent proof that the speaker knew 
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis & Co., 275 Md. 295, 312, 340 A.2d 225, 
235 (1975); Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 633, 270 A.2d 814, 817 (1970); Ace 
Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 366-70, 76 A.2d 566,570-71 (1950); Wm. Dan-
zer & Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 164 Md. 448, 457, 165 A. 463,467 (1933); Dixon v. 
Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 655-59, 382 A.2d 893, 900-01 (1978); see also 
Gordon v. S.S. Vedalin, 346 F. Supp. 1178, 1180-81 (D. Md. 1972) (applying 
Maryland law to determine whether liability of defaulting purchaser should be 
assessed to the corporate entity or to an individual). 
59. Findlay v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. Co., 97 Md. 716, 723, 55 A. 379, 381-82 
(1903) (issuer of prospectus must state all facts accurately and must set forth all 
material information). 
60. For instance, a relationship of special trust exists between a corporate promoter to 
a coryorate bond purchaser, or with respect to a trustee under a mortgage. Id 
61. One lSSUing a prospectus has a duty to omit no facts" 'whichmighl in any degree 
affect the nature, or extent, or quality of the privileges and advantages which the 
prospectus holds out as inducements to take shares.''' Id at 723, 55 A. at 381 
(quoting Savage v. Bartlett, 78 Md. 561, 566, 28 A. 414, 415 (1894» (emphasis 
supplied). 
62. For a more thorough discussion of this policy and the federal standard for materi-
ality of omissions, see generally TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444-
49 (1976). 
63. See Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 685, 212 A.2d 476, 485 (1965) (investor 
"would not have agreed" to purchase shares if he had known facts omitted by 
seller) (emphasis supplied). 
64. 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note I, at § 8.2 to .3. 
65. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
66.Id 
67. 98 Md. 493, 56 A. 794 (1904). 
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that his statement was false, the court could impute scienter if the de-
frauded party could prove that the speaker had no bona fide belief in 
his own statement, or if he pretended to have knowledge "which he 
must have known that he did not have," or the speaker had no reason-
able grounds to believe the truth of the matter asserted, or "was utterly 
reckless and indifferent as to whether it was true."68 Under no circum-
stances, however, could an action in deceit proceed upon negligence.69 
Equity courts, in contrast, applied a more lenient rule for deceit 
actions. Generally, this rule provided that misrepresentations of mate-
rial fact, without more, might justify rescission of a contract alleged to 
have been fraudulently induced.?O Older decisional law establishes 
that in some· circumstances, accurate and complete knowledge of cer-
tain facts was presumed, and courts could thus impute scienter when 
incorrect statements were made. These situations usually involved cor-
porate officers who made factual representations about their own cor-
poration.?) This presumption is of less concern in actions for deceit 
today since the "should have known" standard is available in actions 
for negligent misrepresentations.72 Contrary to the general rule for 
civil actions in Maryland, proof of fraud must be established by "clear 
and satisfactory" evidence rather than by a mere preponderance of 
evidence.73 
B. Negligent Misrepresentations 
By allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentations, Maryland 
has expanded the common law theories of recovery potentially applica-
ble to misrepresentations in securities transactions. In Virginia Dare 
68. Id. at 502-03, 56 A. at 796-97. 
69. The Cahill court noted that a bank officer's liability for negligence would not 
necessarily make him liable for fraud. Id. at 503, 56 A. at 797. 
70. See Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 665, 686, 212 A.2d 476,486 (1965); Clark v. 
Kirsner, 196 Md. 52, 56, 74 A.2d 830, 832 (1950); Euzent v. Barrash, 180 Md. 451, 
454, 25 A.2d 462, 464-65 (1942). 
71. As the court of appeals noted in 1900: 
As president and director of such a financial institution the law imputes 
the requisite knowledge [regarding the institution's solvency] and neither 
he nor they can be given, on account of their willful ignorance, a better 
standing than they would have had if they had performed their duties. 
James Clark Co. v. Colton, 91 Md. 195,204,46 A. 386, 388 (1900) (case dealt with 
the issue of fraudulent preferences in a bankruptcy proceeding rather than an 
action in deceit). Contra Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 502-03, 56 A. 794, 797 
(1904) (mere negligence by a corporate officer in failing to know the true condi-
tion of his busmess does not satisfy the requirement of intent in deceit actions 
because honest negligence cannot sustain fraud under an intentional recklessness 
theory). 
72. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. 
73. First Nat'l Bank of S. Md. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 275 Md. 400, 
411,340 A.2d 275, 283 (1975). But cf. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (in 
actions under federal antifraud provisions, SEC need merely offer proof to a level 
of preponderance of evidence standard). 
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Stores v. Schuman,14 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in a 
case involving personal injury, negligent misrepresentation affords a 
permissible ground for recovery. Recovery under this theory is avail-
able when one relies on a negligently volunteered statement, the 
speaker knows that the recipient wi11likely act upon the statement, and 
that injury may ensue if the statement induces action.75 
Although post-Virginia Dare litigants have rarely invoked the the-
ory of negligent misrepresentation,76 the theory was later broadened to 
include actions for pecuniary loss as well as personal injury.77 To re-
move any uncertainty regarding the elements of this relatively recent 
and infrequently used legal theory, the Court of Appeals of M~ryland 
in 1982 set forth the elements in Martens Chevrolet v. Seney.78 These 
elements are: (1) the speaker owes a duty of care to the recipient of the 
statement and the speaker negligently asserts a false statement; (2) the 
speaker intends the recipient to act upon the statement; (3) the speaker 
knows the recipient will probably rely upon the representation and, if it 
is erroneous, will cause pecuniary or personal injury; (4) the recipient 
justifiably acts in reliance upon the representation, and; (5) the recipi-
ent sustains damage as a proximate cause of the speaker's negligent 
statement. 79 
74. 175 Md. 287, I A.2d 897 (1938). 
75. Id at 291-92, I A.2d at 899. 
76. See, e.g., Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979) (damages awarded 
for physical and emotional injuries induced by negligent misrepresentation by de-
fendant that his divorce was final at the time he remarried); Canatella v. Davis, 
264 Md. 190,286 A.2d 122 (1972) (title company found liable for pecuniary dam-
ages incurred through negligent misrepresentations in title search); Piper v. Jen-
kins, 207 Md. 308, 113 A.2d 919 (1955) (recognizing liability of seller of real 
property when seller negligently indicated boundaries to buyer); Holt v. Kolker, 
189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948) (sustaining recovery for injuries based upon 
negligent misrepresentations by landlord regarding safe condition of porch); Lo-
cal 75, United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Regiec, 19 Md. App. 406, 311 A.2d 
456 (1973) (pecuniary loss incurred by negligent misrepresentations regarding in-
surance coverage). 
77. See Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963) (granting retrial for pecuni-
ary loss suffered by alleged negligent misrepresentaions made during a sale of 
corporate shares). 
78. 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982). 
79. Id at 336-37, 439 A.2d at 539. The court found it necessary to provide this clarifi-
cation because of the confusion engendered by earlier decisions. Compare id (ac-
tion for negligent misrepresentation clarified and affirmed as a cause of action in 
Maryland) with Delmarva Drill Co. v. Tuckahoe, 268 Md. 417, 302 A.2d 37 (1973) 
(no recovery in deceit permitted when basis of allegation is negligent misrepresen-
tation) and Lambert v. Smith, 235 Md. 284, 201 A.2d 491 (1964) (negligent mis-
representation did not provide the requisite showing of reckless' disregard for the 
truth to allow recovery in deceit). Scienter must be proven in some form in an 
action for deceit, Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 56 A. 794 (1904), but is never 
required in actions for negligent misrepresentations. The plaintiffs injured by 
negligent misrepresentations in Delmarva Drill and Lambert failed to bring suit in 
negligence. See also Comment, supra note 9, at 651-71 (discussing historical 
background and development of actions for deceit and negligent 
misrepresentation). 
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The potential impact of this theory of recovery for negligent mis-
representations in securities fraud cases is great. Unlike deceit, negli-
gent misrepresentation requires neither proof of scienter80 nor a "clear 
and convincing standard"81 of proof. When the plaintiff anticipates 
difficulty in proving deceit, an additional count in negligence may pro-
vide a concurrent path to recovery.82 Although untested by case law, 
the court of appeals recently intimated that a failure to speak (i.e., 
omission) in a transaction that creates a duty to do so might constitute 
an actionable negligent misrepresentation.83 
C Statute of Limitations and its Exceptions 
Limitations periods governing actions in deceit or negligent mis-
representation are governed by statute.84 Maryland law provides a 
three year period in which these civil claims must be filed, and the limi-
tations period runs from the time the misrepresentation occurs.85 Al-
though the limitations statutes contain no provision for tolling,86 they 
do provide an important exception of particular relevance to any action 
based upon misrepresentation. Section 5-20387 provides a statutory ex-
ception that arises in those instances where the plaintiff's ignorance of 
an available cause of action is induced by fraud. Under this provision, 
a plaintiff must show that: (1) his ignorance was induced by the fraud 
(initial or subseauent) of the defendant, and (2) the plaintiff used "ordi-
nary diligence"8 to discover any fraud and to protect his rights.89 Con-
structive knowledge~f the fraud may not be imputed in determining 
80. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
82. See Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963) (complaint alleged both 
fraud and negligence, based upon statements made by stockbroker to buyer; count 
in fraud dismissed but right to recovery remanded for trial under theory of negli-
gent misrepresentation). 
83. See Leonard v. Sav-A-Stop Servs., 289 Md. 204, 213, 424 A.2d 336, 340 (1981) 
(assumed that where a party to a transaction has a duty to speak but fails to do so, 
that omission might constitute a negligent misrepresentation; however, court ex-
pressly reserved decision on this point). 
84. Maryland law provides that "[a) civil action at law shall be filed within three years 
from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different 
period of time within which an action shall be commenced." MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984). 
85. See id §§ 5-101 to -205. 
86. See id § 5-101. 
87. Id § 5-203. This statute states: "If a party is kept in ignorance of a cause of action 
by the fraud of an adverse party, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue at 
the time when the party discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence 
should have discovered the fraud." Id 
88. See id Although the court of appeals has also used the phrase "ordinary pru-
dence," the phrase had its genesis in a quote in earlier case law. Maryland courts, 
however, have not indicated that "ordinary prudence" is markedly different from 
"ordinary diligence." Cf: Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 637-38, 431 A.2d 
677,681 (1981) ("ordinary prudence" standard used when plaintiff had, or implic-
itly should have had, actual knowledge of the events giving rise to his cause of 
action); Johnson v. Nadwodny, 55 Md. App. 227, 232-33, 461 A.2d 67, 70 (1983) 
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the accrual date; only actual knowledge, or inquiry notice that suggests 
the plaintiff should have known the existence of the fraud, will suffice.90 
According to the allegations in each case, limitations ma~ be exclu-
sively a question of law or fact, or a combination of both. 1 
To ensure a favorable result on the issue of ordinary diligence, the 
plaintiff must allege and prove ignorance, the time and circumstances 
under which he discovered the fraudulent misrepresentation or con-
cealment, and why the ignorance of his rights extended as long as it 
did.92 
In actions based on negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent con-
duct may delay discovery of the negligence.93 Absent fraud of any 
type, Maryland courts have nevertheless expanded the statutory limita-
tions exception94 into a common law "discovery rule" in negligence ac-
tions.95 The standard for application of this exception is that the action 
accrues when the "claimant in fact knew or reasonably should have 
known of the wrong."96 The limitations on both intentional and negli-
gent misrepresentations can thus conceivably run well past the statu-
tory three year limit. 97 
(discussing development of "ordinary diligence" or "ordinary prudence" tests 
through Maryland case law). 
89. See Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 316-18, 113 A.2d 919, 924 (1955) (plaintiff must 
both use and affirmatively plead diligence to extend the limitations period). 
90. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636-38, 431 A.2d 677, 680-81 (1981); 
accord Johnson v. Nadwodny, 55 Md. App. 227, 232-33, 461 A.2d 67, 70 (1983). 
91. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 633-34, 431 A.2d 677, 679 (1981). Although 
the court of appeals has indicated that in all cases the determination of when an 
action accrues is one for "judicial determination," Harig v. Johns-Manville 
Prods., 284 Md. 70, 74-75, 394 A.2d 299, 302 (1978); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 
Md. 137, 145,215 A.2d 825,830 (1966), the court of special appeals has noted that 
this issue has historically been a question for the trier of fact, and that the court of 
appeals must clarify Po/fenberger to resolve this point. Johnson v. Nadwodny, 55 
Md. App. 227, 232-33, 461 A.2d 67, 70-71 (1983). 
92. See Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 318,113 A.2d 919, 924 (1955) (listing require-
ments of proof to extend limitations where plaintiff alleges fraud). 
93. See Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548,554-55, 187 A.2d 880, 884 (1963) (limitations for 
actions based upon negligent misrepresentations in sale of shares did not run until 
the equivalent of a fraudulent act by the seller was discovered by the buyer). 
94. See supra note 87. 
95. For a thorough discussion of the historical development of this rule in Maryland, 
see Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 633-38, 431 A.2d 677, 679-81 (1981). 
96. The Po/fenberger court stated: 
Having already broken the barrier confining the discovery principle to 
professional malpractice, and sensing no valid reason why that rule's 
sweep should not be applied to prevent an injustice in other types of 
cases, we now hold the discovery rule to be applicable generally in all 
actions and the cause of action accrues when the claimant in fact knew 
or reasonably should have known of the wrong. 
ld at 636, 431 A.2d at 680 (emphasis supplied). 
97. See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Leffler, 228 Md. 262, 179 A.2d 686 (1962) (concealed 
fraud in conveyance of real estate allowed court to hear action 98 months after 
transaction); Sears v. Barker, 155 Md. 323, 141 A. 908 (1928) (fraudulent misrep-
resentations in oil company prospectus extended action to approximately five 
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D. Punitive Damages 
An additional facet of actions at common law is the availability of 
punitive damages. Although these damages may not be obtained in 
cases of "ordinary" fraud, Maryland recognizes certain special circum-
stances that might justify their imposition. In actions for deceit, puni-
tive damages are appropriate when there is either a violation of a 
fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust, where the fraud is gross, or 
exceptional circumstances exist that clearly indicate intentional malice 
and call for the application of this remedy.98 Punitive damages are not 
available when a party acts in good faith.99 A plaintiff must clearly 
prove malice or equivalent willful recklessness. 1OO Recovery for these 
damages is also recognized under actions in negligence, although a 
plaintiff must show actual malice or equivalent recklessness. 101 A court 
cannot award punitive damages, however, unless it has also awarded 
nominal compensatory damages. 102 Although litigants in Maryland 
courts rarely seek punitive damages in actions based upon fraudulent 
securities transactions, once the special criteria have been met, at least 
one court has considered the availability of these damages to defrauded 
sellers of securities.103 In the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, actions at common law are the only method of ob-
taining punitive damages incidental to a securities transaction. They 
are neither available under the Act,I04 nor recognized in the Fourth 
years after purchase of shares). For a more extensive discussion of the legal and 
historical development of the discovery rule of limitations, see generally Com-
ment, Limitations in Professional Malpractice Actions, 28 MD. L. REV. 47 (1968); 
Annot., 43 AL.R.3d 429 (1972); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 127 (1971). 
98. See Fowler v. Benton, 245 Md. 540, 552-53, 226 A2d 556, 564, cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 851 (1967); Loyola Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Trenchcraft, 17 Md. App. 646, 
663,303 A.2d 432, 441 (1973); see also Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 686 
(D. Md. 1975) (citing to "general rule" that while punitive damages are not avail-
able in actions brought solely under Rule lOb-5, they may be awarded, if permis-
sible under state law, when a state claim is joined with the Rule lOb-5 claim). 
99. See Heinz v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942) (punitive damages not 
available when defendant acted in good faith). 
100. See Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128,442 A2d 966 (1982); Wedeman v. City Chev-
rolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A2d 7 (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 
Md. 165, 352 A2d 810 (1976); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 
A.2d 48 (1975). See generally Strausberg, A Roadmap Through Malice, Actual or 
Implied· Punitive Damages in Torts Arising Out of Contract in Maryland, 13 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 275 (1984) (discussing malice requirement for punitive damages in 
torts arising out of contracts). 
101. See H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A2d 48 (1975); American 
Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A2d 407 (1980). 
102. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441,340 A2d 705 (1975); 
Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 291 A2d 64 (1972). 
103. See Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 686-87 (D. Md. 1975) (action brought 
under federal securities acts; court referred to Maryland law for decision as to 
punitive damages). 
104. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -908 (1975 & Supp. 1984). 
Section 11-703(b) of the Act limits a defendant's liability to the consideration paid 
for securities, 16% interest, and reasonable attorney's fees, less any income re-
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Circuit under federallaw}05 
III. THE MARYLAND SECURITIES ACT 
A. Purposes and Methods 
During the early 1900's, fraudulent sales of securities employing 
affirmative misrepresentations and omissions of material facts were 
pervasive. 106 The scope and gravity of this situation was so serious that 
by 1933, every state except Nevada had enacted some form of security 
regulations. 107 Maryland enacted its first securities act in 1920.108 Its 
original form was supplanted in 1962 when Maryland adopted a 
slightly amended version of the Uniform Securities Act as the new state 
act. 109 Amendments made by the General Assembly in 1976 broadened 
certain remedies in the Act 110 and brought the Act substantially to its 
present form. 
The Act has four general purposes: (1) regulation of those buying 
or selling securities; III (2) regulation of certain security offerings to en-
sure full disclosure of facts relevant to investors; 112 (3) civil, criminal, 
and administrative sanctions for violations of the Act, 113 and; (4) impo-
sition of criteria to ensure honesty and veracity in every security trans-
action covered by the statute. I 14 Liability under the Act may be 
ceived on the securities. When read in conjunction with § 11-703(i), which limits 
actions and remedies to those specified in the Act, punitive damages in actions are 
unavailable under § 11-703(b). 
105. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.c. § 78bb(a) (1982) (no recovery 
allowed under 1934 Act that exceeds "actual damages"); see Carras v. Burns, 516 
F.2d 251, 258-60 (4th Cir. 1975); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir. 
1969) (punitive damages not authorized in actions under Rule IOb-5), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 1037 (1970). 
106. For a thorough review of the historical background of both the state and federal 
securities acts, see Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Dis-
closure System, 9 J. CORP. L. I (1983). 
107. Even this nearly universal adoption of securities acts by the states proved inade-
quate to combat the fraudulent practices of itinerant sellers who took refuge in 
neighboring states or used the mails; hence, beginning in 1933 Congress enacted 
the federal scheme for regulating securities transactions. Id at 21 n.87. 
108. See Miller, A Prospectus on the Maryland Securities Act, 23 MD. L. REV. 289, 289 
(1963). 
109. Id at 291. 
110. 1976 Md. Laws 615 (effective July I, 1976). The amendment's most significant 
change was to afford a civil remedy to defrauded sellers. Cf. Goodman v. Poland, 
395 F. Supp. 660, 681-82 (D. Md. 1975) (federal district court interpreting Mary-
land law refused to imply a remedy for a defrauded seller of securities under the 
pre-amendment version of the Act); see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. 
Ill. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-301 to -302, -304, -401 (1975); see 
also Miller, supra note 108, at 291-92 (discussing purposes and policies of the 
Act). 
112. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-303 to -304, -501 (1975). 
113. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-412 to -417, -512, -603, -701 to -703 
(1975 & Supp. 1984). 
114. See id §§ 11-301 to -304, -703. 
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premised upon violation of its registration requirements1l5 and certain 
technical requirements pertaining to those in the business of transact-
ing securities l16 and upon misrepresentations in the sale or purchase of 
securities. 117 Prior to examining the civil liabilities for misrepresenta-
tions, the following will provide a brief overview of the general 
prohibitions and liabilities created by the Act. 
Broker-dealers l18 and their agents1l9 may not engage in securities 
transactions within Maryland unless they are registered with the Mary-
land Division of Securities (Division).120 They may not offer or sell 
any security that is not registered, or properly exempted from registra-
tion, under the Act. 121 In addition, those dealing in securities may not 
defraud those with whom they transact business by any fraudulent 
schemes or practices,122 misrepresentations or omissions of fact made to 
the Division under the Act,12 or by misrepresentations or omissions to 
those to whom securities are being offered, sold, or from whom they are 
being purchased. 124 
Section 11_703 125 of the Act defines the civil remedies available to 
lIS. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1I-401 to -417, -501 to -513 (1975). 
116. See supra note 114. 
1I7. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-301 to -304, -703 (1975 & Supp. 
1984). 
1I8. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-101(c) (1975) (defining phrase). 
119. Id §§ 11-401 to -402 (defining term). 
120. See id 
121. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-301 to -304, -703 (1975 & Supp. 
1984). 
122. See id 
123. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-303 (1975). 
124. See supra note 122. 
125. Section 11-703 provides: 
(a) When seller or purchaser is liable. - (1) A person is civilly liable to 
the person buying a security from him if he: 
(i) Offers or sells the security in violation of §§ 11-304(b), 11-401, or 11-
501 of this title, or of any rule or order under § 11-205 of this title which 
requires the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used; or 
(ii) Offers or sells the security by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading, the buyer not knowing of the untruth or 
omission, and if he does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not 
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of 
the untruth or omission. 
(2) A person is civilly liable to the person selling a security to him if he: 
(i) Offers to purchase or purchases the security in violation of §§ 11-902, 
1I-903, 11-904, or 11-905 of this title; or 
(ii) Offers to purchase or purchases the security by means of any untrue 
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact nec-
essary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they are made, not misleading, the seller not 
knowing of the untruth or omission, and if he does not sustain the bur-
den of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the untruth or omission. 
MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703 (1975 & Supp. 1984). 
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offerees,126 buyers, and sellers l27 defrauded in the course of securities 
transactions. This statute provides a basis for recovery for fraud 
through the misstatement or omission of material facts, although the 
Act modifies the elements for actionable fraud required in suits at com-
mon law. 128 Recovery under the Act requires proof that a transaction 
was made "by means of' a misrepresentation or omission of a material 
fact made under circumstances where the misrepresentation is mislead-
ing, and the offeree/defrauded party was either unaware of the untruth 
or omission, or "in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known of the untruth or omission."129 
The 1976 amendment is particuarly noteworthy since it expressly 
broadened the statutory remedy. Prior to the amendment, the Act J'ro-
vided relief only for persons defrauded when buying securities.13 In 
Goodman v. Poland,131 the plaintiff requested the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland to imply a right of action for de-
frauded sellers under the pre-1976 version of section 11-703.132 The 
seller contended that section 11-703 was an almost "verbatim copy" of 
federal Rule IOb_5,133 and thus embodied the federal decisional law 
that implied defrauded sellers rights under the federal law.134 The 
Goodman court rejected the seller's argument, noting that the relevant 
sections of the Act had been adopted "verbatim" from the Uniform 
Securities Act (Uniform Act),135 which in tum was modeled on Rule 
IOb-5.136 The court reviewed sections 101 and 41O(h) of the Uniform 
Act and noted that these sections clearly distinguished between the 
rights of defrauded buyers and sellers. Moreover, these sections were 
126. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ ll-lOl(j) (defining offer), 11-
703(a)(1)(ii), 11-703(a)(2)(ii) (liability to offerees) (1975 & Supp. 1984). 
127. See id. §§ 11-703(a)(1)(ii), -703(a)(2)(ii); see also supra note 110 (development of 
civil right for defrauded sellers under the Act). 
128. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § ll-102(b) (1975) ("As used in this title, 
'fraud,' 'deceit' and 'defraud' are not limited to common law deceit.") (emphasis 
supplied). 
129. Compare Suburban Properties Management, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460, 
204 A.2d 326, 329 (1964) (elements required for common law deceit actions in 
Maryland) with MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703 (1975 & Supp. 1984) 
(civil liability for misrepresentation under the Act). 
130. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703(a) (1975) (prior to the 1976 
amendment, the Act did not provide an express remedy for defrauded sellers). 
131. 395 F. Supp. 660 (D. Md. 1975). 
132.Id. at 680-82 (court applied MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 13 (1971), the predecessor 
to section 11-703). 
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983) (Rule lOb-5). 
134. In support of this argument, the plaintiffs cited Brune, Rule IOb-5 and the General 
Law as to Deceit in Securities Transactions in Maryland, 33 MD. L. REV. 129, 139-
40 (1973); Miller, supra note 108, at 294. Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 681. 
135. Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 681; see MD. ANN. CODE. arts. 13, 34h (1971); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983) (S.E.C. Rule lOb-5); UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 101, 41Oh, 7A 
U.L.A. 567-698 (1978 & Supp. 1984). 
136. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1978 & Supp. 1984) (commisioners' 
notes cite origins of the Uniform Act). 
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expressly designed and drafted to preclude the development of an im-
plied cause of action for defrauded sellers similar to that which arose 
under federal Rule IOb-5. I37 
The Goodman court next reasoned that since the General Assem-
bly had access to the commissioners' notes to the Uniform Act, the near 
verbatim adoption of the Uniform Act as state law clearly indicated a 
legislative intent not to afford an implied right of action to sellers. 138 
Coupled with the express language of section 11-703(i) of the Act, the 
court felt restrained from attempting to imply any rights under the Act. 
Finally, because the Court of Appeals of Maryland had never analyzed 
the issue of an implied right for sellers under section 11-703, the Good-
man court observed that the question was one that would be the proper 
subject of a certified question under the Uniform Certification of Ques-
tions of Law Act.139 Since the court felt that the certification would 
"considerably delay the ultimate disposition" of the case,140 and be-
cause the entire issue dealt with "merely a parallel state law claim to 
the federal claim alleged" in the first count,141 it dismissed the plain-
tiffs' state law claim under the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. 142 
In the year following Goodman, section 11-703 of the Maryland 
Securities Act was amended 143 to provide express protection to both 
defrauded sellers and buyers of securities. 
B. State Decisional Law Under the Act 
Maryland courts have had few opportunities to interpret the Act's 
antifraud provisions. l44 This situation is primarily attributable to the 
137. Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 681. 
138. Id at 681-82. 
139. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1984) (establishing 
procedure whereby Court of Appeals of Maryland will decide cases of first im-
pression arising under state law in federal court proceedings). 
140. Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 682. 
141. Id The plaintiffs' counts included allegations of misrepresentation under Rule 
IOb-5, violation of a fiduciary duty between controlling shareholders under Mary-
land common law, misrepresentations in contravention of the antifraud provisions 
of the Act, and a count seeking punitive damages. Id at 670-71. 
142. Id at 680-82. 
143. 1976 Md. Laws 615. 
144. As one federal court recently noted, claims under the Act have rarely been liti-
gated in Maryland's courts. O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (D. 
Md. 1982). For a review of the very few reported state cases in which the Act was 
involved, see Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 686-87, 212 A.2d 476, 486-87 
(1965) (court granted rescission of contract for purchase of controlling shares in 
corporation because of material misstatements and omissions under Maryland 
common law, the Act, and the Securities Act of 1933); Mountain Manor Realty, 
Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 Md. App. 185, 194,461 A.2d 45,51 (1983) (in an action seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that a sale of shares was void, court noted that no 
claims had been presented by the litigants under § 11-301 of the Act); Wartzman 
v. Hightower Prods., Ltd., 53 Md. App. 656, 659-60, 456 A.2d 82, 84-85 (1983) 
(legal malpractice suit precipitated by failure of an attorney to comply with the 
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availability of federal pendent jurisdiction. 145 Because the Act closely 
parallels federal securities law,146 a misrepresentation in a securities 
transaction will often violate both. Actions are therefore most fre-
quently brought in federal court, with state claims under the Act heard 
through federal pendent jurisdiction. 147 
The foregoing demonstrates that plaintiffs should consider several 
matters when prosecuting a state Act claim in state court. First, al-
though state courts will often refer to federal decisions for guidance, 
they are not bound by federal court interpretations of state law. 148 Sec-
ond, and closely related, the notable absence of significant state law 
may allow the skillful practitioner to create favorable case law in the 
state courtS. 149 The countervailing consideration is that the lack of ex-
posure to actions under the Act has practically relegated it to terra in-
cognita within the state courts, and has placed the state judiciary in a 
position where an advocate may be required to instruct as well as ar-
gue. Although dealing with criminal liability under the Act, a 1979 de-
cision by the court of special appeals, Hohensee v. State,150 illustrates 
this point. This careful opinion traced the history of the Act l51 and 
contained extensive statutory quotations. 152 Despite the court's will-
ingness to examine thoroughly the historical background, legislative in-
tent, and statutory construction of the Act, its holding regarding 
criminal liability under section 11-402 has been criticized for misinter-
preting the Act's private offering registration exemption. 153 
disclosure provisions of the Act); Hohensee v. State, 42 Md. App. 329, 339-40, 400 
A.2d 455, 461 (1979) (reversing criminal conviction under § 11-402 of the Act). 
145. See infra notes 271-98 and accompanying text. 
146. See Miller, supra note 108, at 294; accord O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 
1026, 1032 (D. Md. 1982) (identity of statutory terms between state and federal 
securities acts); Evans v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 535 F. Supp. 
499, 508 (D. Md. 1982) (in a civil rights case, court observed that federal Rule 
IOb-5 was nearly identical to fraud provisions in the Act) (dictum). 
147. For a discussion of federal pendent jurisdiction of state securities claims, see infra 
notes 271-98 and accompanying text. 
148. See Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 690-91, 344 A.2d 80, 81 (1975); Lahocki v. 
Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490 (1979), rev'd on other 
grounds, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980). 
149. This potential flexibility of securities law at the state level will rarely broaden the 
scope of remedies available under the federal acts without a determined effort to 
emphasize the differences between the state and federal regulations. See O'Neil v. 
Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Md. 1982), where the court remarked: 
There is a dearth of Maryland law on the reach of the state [Act) .... 
In light of the identity of the statutory terms and in the absence of state 
law to the contrary, the reasonable conclusion is that the Maryland 
courts would not find a cause of action under state law when there is 
none under federal law. 
Id at 1032 (emphasis supplied). 
ISO. 42 Md. App. 329,400 A.2d 455 (1979). 
151. Id at 330-33, 400 A.2d at 456-57. 
152. Id at 333-36, 400 A.2d at 457-59. 
153. See Sargent, State Limited and Private Offering Exemptions: The Maryland Experi-
ence in a National Perspective, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 496 (1984). 
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Despite the freedom of state courts to disregard federal court deci-
sions on state law,154 the paucity of state court decisions concerning the 
Act l55 makes it necessary to review federal district court decisions that 
bear upon the Act. These decisions highlight the distinctions drawn by 
one court system between the Act, common law, and federal regula-
tions and thus provide fertile ground for development of the Act 
through case law at the state level. These federal decisions likewise 
serve to emphasize differences between the state and federal securities 
laws that federal courts, which will hear any claims under state law 
through pendent jurisdiction, have found significant. 
IV. COMPARISON OF STATE AND FEDERAL SECURITIES 
STATUTES 
A. Standing 
Section 11-703 of the Act provides express civil liability for a 
number of specific misrepresentations that might be made during a se-
curities transaction, 156 as well as a broad remedy for misrepresentations 
generally.157 A seller is liable under the Act if he misrepresents that the 
security registration certificate issued by the Commissioner of the Divi-
sion signifies that the Division found the securities prospectus to be 
truthful and not misleading, or that the Commissioner has approved or 
recommended either the security or its sale. 158 Finally, sellers and pur-
chasers of securities are civilly liable whenever a transaction is made 
"by means of any untrue statement of material fact or omission to state 
a material fact."159 
As several courts have noted, the goal of the Act is comparable to 
that of the federal regulatory scheme. 16o For instance, section 12(2)161 
of the Securities Act of 1933 162 expressly allows recovery for a seller's 
misrepresentations or omissions made in a prospectus or oral commu-
nication. Section 17(a)163 of the 1933 Act is apparently a penal provi-
sion that prohibits the sale of securities through fraudulent schemes, 
practices, misrepresentations, or omissions. The Fourth Circuit has 
154. See supra note 148. 
155. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
156. MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-703(a)(I)(i), -703(b)(I)(i) (1975 & Supp. 
1984). 
157. ld §§ 11-703(a)(I)(ii), -703(b)(I)(ii). 
158. See supra note 125. 
159. See infra note 160. A private right of action also arises under the following cir-
cumstances: a seller is not registered as a broker-dealer or agent under the Act; a 
security sold was not properly registered or exempted from registration under the 
Act; or a seller fails to file the prospectus or other advertising literature that de-
scribes the securities he is selling. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-
703(a)(I)(i) (1975 & Supp. 1984). 
160. See sources cited supra note 146. 
161. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). 
162. ld §§ 77a to 77aa. 
163. ld § 77q(a). 
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held, however, that section 17(a) provides an implied civil right to de-
frauded buyers as well. l64 Section 1O(b)165 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934166 and its accompanying Rule lOb-5 167 is another penal 
provision under which courts have implied civil liability. 168 Rule lOb-5 
is thus analogous to both the criminal provisions of section 11-301169 
and the civil provisions of section 11-703 170 of the Act. 
Distinctions between the statutory schemes arise, however, based 
upon whether the civil liability is express (as in the Act) or implied (as 
under Rule lOb-5). Section 11-703(i)171 states that all rights and reme-
dies provided by the Act are "in addition to any other rights or actions 
that exist in law or equity, but this title [l1J does not create any cause 
of action not specified in this section .... "172 Implied remedies there-
fore may not be fashioned to increase the protection afforded by the 
express remedies in the state Act, which as noted above is contrary to 
the development of the federal protections. 173 Although it was once 
assumed that the close similarity between the state and federal statutes 
assured that the Act would consequently "inherit a long line of federal 
judicial and administrative precedent,"174 this proposition was ana-
lyzed and rejected in a 1975 federal district court decision, based upon 
a strict construction of section 11-703(i).175 This tension between the 
state and federal acts provides a backdrop for several distinctions that 
arise under actions based upon either regulatory scheme. 
164. See, e.g., Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 98 (4th Cir. 1975); Kaufman v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 537 (D. Md. 1978); Oliver 
v. Bostetter, 426 F. Supp. 1082, 1087 (D. Md. 1977) (implied private right under 
section 17(a) for defrauded purchasers). The Supreme Court has expressly re-
served decision on the availability of a private remedy under section 17(a). See 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 685 n.2 (1983). For a com-
plete listing of the federal courts of appeals cases that have analyzed this implied 
right, see 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note I, § 8.5, at 331-32; L. 
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1784-91 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969). 
165. 15 U.S.c. § 78j (1982). 
166. Id. §§ 78a to 78kk (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.0-1 to .31-1 (1983». 
167. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983). 
168. The first case to deal with the implied civil liability aspect of Rule IOb-5 was 
decided in 1946. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 
1946). For an overview of the development of subsequent cases, see I A. BROM-
BERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note I, § 2.4(000)-(110), at 2:57-2:62 (1983). 
169. Compare Rule IOb-5 wi'" MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-301 (1975). 
170. Compare Rule IOb-5 wi'" MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-301 (1975). 
171. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703(i) (1975 & Supp. 1984). 
172. Id. (emphasis supplied). 
173. Compare Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660 (D. Md. 1975) (refusing to imply 
right to defrauded buyer under pre-1976 version of the Act) wi'" I A. BROMBERG 
& L. LOWENFELS, supra note I, § 2.2(462), at 2:35-2:41 (tracing historical expan-
sion of implied remedies under Rule IOb-5 through federal decisional law). 
174. See Miller, supra note 108, at 294. 
175. Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 680-82 (D. Md. 1975). 
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B. Scienter: "Fraud" v. "Misleading" 
Rule IOb-5, the major source of federal administrative and civil 
authority in regulating securities transactions, expressly prohibits 
"fraud," "deceit," and attempts to "defraud."176 In Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochjelder,J77 the Supreme Court scrutinized the wording and legisla-
tive history of Rule IOb-5, and held that "[t]he words 'manipulative or 
deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly 
suggest that Section lOeb) was intended to proscribe knowing or inten-
tional misconduct."178 The Hochfelder Court read the statutory lan-
guage as expressing a congressional intent not to impose a standard of 
negligence under Rule IOb_5. 179 The additional consideration that the 
civil remedy under Rule IOb-5 was a 'judicially implied liability"180 
argued for a strict construction of the statutory language. The Court 
thus held that the element of scienter is required for recovery in Rule 
IOb-5 civil actions. Under Rule IOb-5, one federal court has inferred 
scienter through recklessness, in much the same manner as in common 
law actions. 181 A plaintiff must prove scienter whether the misrepresen-
tation is caused by either an untrue statement or an omission. 182 
The implied federal remedy is in sharp contrast to the express civil 
remedies detailed in section 11-703 of the Act. Absent from section 11-
703 are such words as "fraud," "deceit," or "manipulate"; rather, the 
section prohibits the use of untrue statements or omissions of material 
facts in any securities transaction. Without reference to any type of 
intentional conduct or ulterior schemes or motives, section 11-703 sim-
ply prohibits any omissions that are "misleading." The lack of prohibi-
tions specifying fraudulent or other intentional conduct, coupled with 
the inclusion of a "misleading" standard, suggest that scienter is not a 
requirement under the Act. Consequently, untrue statements or omis-
sions negligently made are arguably as actionable as intentional ones. 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland has 
apparently, at least in dictum, reached this precise conclusion. In 
O'Hara v. Kovens,183 the plaintiff requested the Fourth Circuit to apply 
the three year statute of limitations for common law suits in Maryland 
to an action under Rule IOb-5, rather than the one year limitation 
under the Act. The plaintiff contended that the scienter requirement in 
176. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983). 
177. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
178. Id at 197. 
179. Id at 206-14. 
180. Id at 200-01. 
181. See Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 
537 (D. Md. 1978) (a showing of recklessness may be sufficient to satisfy the scien-
ter requirement of Rule lOb-5). 
182. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 255-57 (D. Md. 1971), on 
remand, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973) (discussing methods of proving scienter in 
omission cases), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). 
183. 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). 
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both Rule 10b-5 and common law fraud actions compelled the use of 
the longer limitations period. The O'Hara court observed that Rule 
10b-5 afforded protection to investors more closely analogous to that 
offered by the Act than the common law and thus applied the one year 
limitation, although noting that "there appears to be no requirement of 
scienter under Maryland's blue sky statute."184 
The presence or absence of scienter is thus of crucial importance 
when selecting a forum and in determining whether to include alterna-
tive or additional counts in a securities action. Provided the plaintiff 
can establish an intent to defraud, the action may be brought in federal 
court with an additional count under the provisions of section 11-703, 
and a count in common law fraud. If, however, it appears that the suit 
must be premised upon a negligence theory, Rule lOb-5 cannot be used 
as the sole cause of action under federallaw 185 without risking dismis-
sal. In the event no other federal statute is implicated, bringing suit in 
state court under section 11-703 of the Act and an additional common 
law count for negligent misrepresentation would appear to be the best 
approach. 
C Misstatements and Omissions 
With its rules for interpretation, the Act allows somewhat more 
liberal theories of recovery than those offered by the common law. 
Section ll-102(b) 186 states that use of the terms "fraud," "deceit," and 
"defrauded" are not limited to common law deceit. As noted previ-
ously,187 a defrauded plaintiff may recover under section 11-703 for the 
negligent misrepresentations of another party despite the common law 
limitation that actions in deceit could never be based upon negli-
gence. 188 Other aspects of actions under both the federal and state acts, 
however, remain consistent with common law standards and criteria. 
An action under section 11-703 of the Act requires proof of an 
untrue statement or omission of material fact. With a view to Mary-
land's common law, state courts are likely to insist that untrue state-
ments relate to a past or existing ascertainable fact in § 11-703 
actions,189 or a definite promise to perform. 190 Because the Act does 
184. O'Hara, 625 F.2d at 17. At trial, the same argument was presented but was not 
found dispositive by the court. See O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 
(D. Md. 1979) ("Although scienter is now required as an element of a IOb-5 of-
fense, it is only partially relevant to picking the appropriate limitations period."), 
affd, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). 
185. Recovery under a negligence theory is available under sections II, 12(2) and 15 of 
the Securities Act of 1933 (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 17k, 771(2), 170 (1982». See 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-09 (1976). 
186. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § ll-102(b) (1975). 
187. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (action in deceit requires scienter). 
189. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
190. Id 
598 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 13 
not limit its scope to common law deceit,191 however, it is conceivable 
that recovery under the Act might be premised upon strong opinions 
spoken by the defendant to induce some action by the claimant. 192 
There is some precedent for this approach in federal law. Although 
federal courts still recognize that some "puffing" in sales transactions 
will not create liability for misrepresentation,193 any statement or opin-
ion in a technical report that lacks factual foundation may become a 
source of liability. 194 
.D. Materiality 
1. Misstatements of Fact 
To recover under section 11-703, a misrepresentaion must be ma-
terial to the securities transaction. Once a plaintiff alleges an affirma-
tive or negligent misrepresentation, Maryland courts will find 
materiality if, without the misrepresentation, or if the falsity had been 
known, the transaction would not have been completed. 195 No compel-
ling policy reason apparently exists for using a different standard for 
materiality under the Act than the one used in actions at common law. 
In Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 196 the Court of Appeals of Maryland implic-
itly used the same standard for materiality in an action alleging com-
mon law fraud and violations of the state and federal securities acts. 191 
Moreover, this approach comports with the definition of materiality 
used in federal securities law. 198 
2. Omissions of Fact 
Determining the materiality of, and reliance upon, an onusslOn 
has historically presented a more challenging task. 199 Because a state-
ment is not the source of liability in a case involving an omission, it is 
clear that the plaintiff will encounter difficulty in proving that what was 
191. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
192. The remedial nature of section 11-703 may be extended to great lengths if Mary-
land state courts hold that "the monumental incredulity of the victim is no shield 
for the accused." Deaver v. United States, 155 F.2d 740, 744-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 329 U.S. 766 (1946). 
193. See L. Loss, supra note 164, at 1438 n.28. 
194. For an extensive line of cases supporting this proposition, see id at 1436-37 nn.23-
26. 
195. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
196. 239 Md. 669, 212 A.2d 476 (1965). 
197. Id at 685-87, 212 A.2d at 485-86 (no distinctions made by court regarding the 
standard for materiality in an action at common law for rescission, and under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, and the Act). 
198. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (a representation is 
material if a reasonable person would attach importance to it in determining his 
choice of action). 
199. For a discussion of the development of decisional law in this area under Rule IOb-
5, see Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under s.£. C Rule lOb-5, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975). 
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not said was material to the transaction and that he relied upon some-
thing not done by the defendant. 200 
Under the Act, it is more likely that the standard for materiality in 
omissions cases will comport with those for common law actions, since 
a body of pre-Act decisional law exists on this subject201 and the Act 
manifests no intention of ignoring or significantly modifying this com-
mon law element. Essentially, proof of materiality will require a show-
ing that a reasonable investor would have relied upon the omitted 
information when deciding whether to enter into the transaction. 
Nondisclosure cases under the federal acts hold the threshold of 
materiality at a slightly higher level. In short, a nondisclosure is mate-
rial if there is "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important. "202 
E. Reliance 
Reliance is statutorily required under the Act because the transac-
tion must be made "by means" of a material misrepresentation.203 Re-
liance upon a misrepresentation is apparently implicit within any 
finding that a misrepresentation is material. This proposition rests on 
the rationale that if a transaction would not have been consummated 
"but for" the representation, thus making the misrepresentation mate-
rial,204 the aggrieved party must necessarily have relied upon the mate-
rial misrepresentation.20s In actions at common law206 as well as under 
the federal securities acts, the test for reliance is a narrowing of the 
standard for materiality to determine if the misrepresentation is the 
proximate cause of the damage alleged. The issue thus focuses upon 
whether the specific plaintiff, rather than the reasonable person, would 
have completed the transaction but for the material misstatement.2°7 A 
litigant may prove reliance in an omission case under the Act by show-
ing that the specific plaintiff would not have entered into the transac-
200. Id. at 590 nn.30-32 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
202. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445-50 (1975) (emphasis sup-
plied). Northway dealt with the materiality of an omission under Section 14a of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S.E.C. Rule 14a-9 (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240-14a-9 (1983». Because the broad policy considerations underlying Rule 
14a-9 are analogous to those behind Rule IOb-5, the same standard thus appears 
applicable to both. See Northway, 426 U.S. at 449 n.lO. 
203. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703(a)(1)(ii) (1975 & Supp. 1984). 
204. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
205. See Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251,257 (4th Cir. 1975) (''when a broker misrepre-
sents a material fact. . . it may be inferred that the customer would have relied 
on the broker's statement .... ") (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 
406 U.S. 128 (1972». 
206. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (discussing 
interplay and applicability of common law elements of materiality and reliance to 
actions under Rule IOb-5). 
207. See supra note 205. 
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tion if the omitted representation had been known to him.208 By 
contrast, reliance in an omission case under federal securities law may 
allow a somewhat lower standard of proof. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. 
United States,209 the Supreme Court held that in an omission case 
under Rule lOb-5, affirmative proof of reliance upon the omitted facts 
was not a prerequisite to recovery. Rather, a court would presume reli-
ance whenever it was shown that the defendant owed a duty to disclose 
and did not disclose a material fact to the investor.210 After Affiliated 
Ute, some federal courts of appeals have applied this presumption nar-
rowly.2 11 The Fourth Circuit in 1973, in Johns Hopkins University v. 
HUllon,212 stated that Affiliated Ute "cast some doubt upon the part 
played by reliance in Rule lOb-5 cases .... "213 Rather than attempt-
ing to resolve this doubt, however, the Hulton court held that the "es-
sentiality" of the omitted information to the plaintiff in that case 
satisfied the reliance standard for misrepresentation as expressed in List 
v. Fashion Park, Inc. 214 and ended all analysis at that point.215 Two 
years later the Fourth Circuit citedAJliliated Ute as controlling when it 
held that "it may be inferred" that a customer would have relied upon 
material facts withheld by a broker.216 Although Affiliated Ute does 
not eliminate the need to prove reliance in nondisclosure cases under 
the federal securities acts, the threshold of proof is lowered to demon-
strating a misrepresentation through an omission to state a material 
fact.217 
F. Due Diligence 
Section 11-703 of the Act requires the plaintiff to bear the burden 
of proving that "in the exercise of reasonable care [he] could not have 
known of the untruth or omission."218 The plaintiffs failure to prove 
the exercise of reasonable care thus will result in dismissal. 
208. See, e.g., Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 685, 212 A.2d 476, 485 (1965) ("It 
seems apparent that if Shulton had known [the truth of the matters misrepre-
sented by the defendant] it would not have agreed to make a $300,000 investment 
.... "). 
209. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
210. Id at 152-54; see also Note, supra note 199, at 584, 586-89. 
211. See Note, supra 199, at nn.22-28 and accompanying text. 
212. 448 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). 
213. Hulton, 448 F.2d at 914. 
214. 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965). 
215. Hulton, 448 F.2d at 914-15 (citing List, 340 F.2d 457); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. 
Supp. 128, 140 (D. Md. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970). 
216. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975); see Note, supra note 199, at 587 
nn.17-21 and accompanying text. . 
217. For a thorough discussion of the development of the reliance standard in actions 
under the federal securities acts, see 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 
§ 64.01 (rev. ed. 1980). 
218. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703(a)(l)(ii), -703(a)(2)(ii) (1975 & Supp. 
1984). For the text of these provisions, see supra note 125. 
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Because the Act provides no standard for determining the level of 
reasonable care required to satisfy the burden of proof, and because 
there are no cases defining the standard, guidance in analyzing the is-
sue of reasonable care may be obtained from surveying the analogous 
issue of due diligence in cases that were decided upon the issue of limi-
tations.219 The standard for due diligence is flexible and is usually re-
solved on a case-by-case basis.220 Essentially, the standard is whether 
the plaintiff "should have had knowledge of facts giving rise to his right 
or cause of action."221 
Due diligence does not dictate that a plaintiff proceed immediately 
to verify all representations.222 Relevant circumstances or factors in-
clude the relative situation of the parties, the extent of their access to 
information, large fluctuations in value, the absence of probable 
grounds for imputing intentional fraud, the loss of evidence, and the 
presence or absence of any impediments to the assertion of the claim.223 
The use of due diligence in actions under federal securities law is 
a more difficult question, and there is no simple or uniform standard 
among the federal courtS.224 In essence,. this confusion stems from de-
termining whether the plaintiff must plead due diligence, or whether it 
must be asserted by the defendant as an affirmative defense.225 
Due diligence by the plaintiff is most often the subject of close 
219. See supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text; if. Atholwood Dev. Co. v. Hous-
ton, 179 Md. 441, 446, 19 A.2d 706, 708 (1941) (although not a securities transac-
tions case, the court held that "[t)he manner in which a person of ordinary 
diligence would presumably act under similar circumstances is the standard by 
which the court should determine whether this duty was properly performed."). 
220. "There is no inflexible rule as to what constitutes, or what does not constitute 
laches; hence its existence must be determined by the facts and circumstances of 
each case." Skeen v. McCarthy, 46 Md. App. 434, 438, 418 A.2d 1214,1217 (1980) 
(quoting Parker v. Board of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126, 130, 186 A.2d 195, 
197 (1962). The defense oflaches requires proof that the party against whom it is 
being asserted unreasonably delayed in bringing his action through a want of due 
diligence and that this delay prejudiced the defendant. See also Brady v. Berke, 
33 Md. App. 27, 34-35, 363 A.2d 537, 541-42 (1976) (time cannot run for the pur-
poses of laches until the party charged should have had knowledge of his cause of 
action) (citations omitted). 
221. Brady v. Berke, 33 Md. App. 27, 34-35, 363 A.2d 537, 541 (1976) (citations omit-
ted), quoted in Skeen v. McCarthy, 46 Md. App. 434, 439, 418 A.2d 1214, 1217 
(1980). 
222. Marbury v. Stonestreet, I Md. 147, 161 (1852) ("When one party to a contract 
makes a representation on which the other relies, it is not laches in him not to 
proceed immediately to verify that statement."). 
223. Skeen v. McCarthy, 46 Md. App. 434, 438, 418 A.2d 1214, 1217 (1980) (quoting 
Akin v. Evans, 221 Md. 125, 132-33, 156 A.2d 219, 224 (1959». 
224. This comment is limited to highlighting certain cases to illustrate both the com-
plexity of the due diligence defense and standards for its use in securities transac-
tions, and emphasizing that it must be addressed in all securities cases. For an 
extensive discussion of the various views among the federal courts on this subject, 
see 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 217, § 63, at 3-180.24. 
225.1d § 64.01 [b), at 3-206 nn.69.01-81 and accompanying text (federal decisional law 
discussing due diligence). 
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review when the defendant raises the defense of limitations.226 In a 
civil action brought under Rule lOb-5, the Fourth Circuit in Baumel v. 
Rosen 227 found that the defrauded plaintiff had lost his right to rescis-
sion of the sale of his shares for failure to file his action "within a 
reasonable time after discovery of the ground for recission,"228 yet al-
lowed the plaintiff to recover damages because the defendant had ac-
quired the shares fraudulently.229 Although the plaintiff was not found 
to have acted diligently, the court nonetheless granted recovery.230 
Courts have also imposed a standard of due diligence upon plain-
tiffs to ascertain the truth of all representations made by the defendant 
during the course of the transaction.231 After the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 232 removed the negligence stan-
dard in Rule lOb-5 actions, some courts indicated that it would be 
unfair to hold harmless those who make negligent misrepresentations, 
while concurrently demanding that plaintiffs meet a negligence-derived 
standard of due diligence.233 These courts have thus held that a plain-
tiff need not demonstrate due diligence to support recovery, or have 
made the plaintiffs duty more flexible and less rigorous.234 Even in the 
absence of a rigorous due diligence duty, however, courts will not allow 
the plaintiff to rely upon a statement that he should have known to be 
obviously false or when inquiry notice arises.235 
Due diligence is also used as a' standard to judge the culpability of 
the defendant's conduct.236 Since Rule lOb-5 requires scienter, a de-
fendant cannot be held strictly liable for a negligent investigation,237 
although in some circumstances a failure to use due diligence might be 
226. See Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 (10th Cir. 1980) 
("Under both Colorado and federal law, the limitations period begins to run when 
the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered by the exercise 0/ reason-
able diligence, the facts constituting the fraud.") (emphasis supplied); see also 5 A. 
JACOBS, supra note 217, § 235.03 (determining when limitations periods begin to 
run under the federal securities acts). 
227.412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cerro denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970). 
228. Baumel, 412 F.2d at 574. 
229. Id at 575-76. 
230. Id at 574-76. 
231. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 217, § 64.01[b), at 3-206 nn.70-76 and accompanying 
notes. 
232. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). For a discussion of Hoch/elder, see supra notes 176-82 and 
accompanying text. 
233. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 217, § 64.01[b), at 3-209, nn.76.01-76.03 and accom-
panying text. 
234.ld 
235. Id § 64.01[b), at 3-208 nn.75-76. 
236. See Hochfelder V. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1115 (9th Cir. 1974) (account-
ant's due diligence mi~t be found inadequate through inquiry notice when he 
fails to disclose variation of internal office procedures in audited corporation), 
rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
237. Under the strict liability provisions of section 12(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, a 
defendant arguably could be penalized for making any statements that he cannot 
verify through reasonable diligence. 
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viewed as willful and reckless behavior sufficient to imply an intent to 
defraud.238 
Although no appellate court has ever decided the issue, it appears 
that section 11-703 does not provide similar refuge for defendants. The 
Act specifies diligence, or reasonable care, of the plaintiff,239 but is si-
lent as to either a due diligence duty or defense for a defendant. Cou-
pled with the apparent lack of a scienter requirement, the defendant's 
inability to verify the truth of the misrepresentation will probably not 
afford a basis for defense. 240 . 
G. Statutesoj Limitations 
The statute of limitations contained in the Act241 dictates that a 
civil action for misrepresentation be brought "within one year after the 
discovery of the untrue statement or omission, or after the discovery 
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence."242 
The Act further provides that, in any event, no suit may be brought 
later than three years after the date of contract of any purchase or sale 
of securities.243 
This statute, however, is the starting rather than ending point for a 
discussion of the limitations period under the Act. Although the Act 
contains no provisions for tolling limitations,244 the Act's limitations 
must be construed in conjunction with two other factors. First, the gen-
eral statutory245 exception to limitations, which directs that "if a party 
is kept in ignorance of a cause of action by the fraud of an adverse 
party," provides that limitations do not run until the fraud is, or 
should have been, discovered.246 The second factor is the impact of 
Poffenberger v. Risser, 247 in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
238. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 217, § 63, at 3-180.7 nn.22-32 and accompanying text. 
239. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703(a)(l)(ii), -703(a)(2)(ii) (1975 & Supp. 
1984). 
240. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. In addition, a very narrow read-
ing of the Act suggests at least the possibility of strict liability in civil actions. 
241. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703(f) (1975 & Supp. 1984). 
242. Id § 11-703(f)(2)(ii). 
243. Id § 11-703(f)(1). 
244. Id; see also O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18-19 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that the 
Act makes no provision for tolling due to incompetency; because the court 
adopted the limitations period in the Act for an action under Rule lOb-5, it felt it 
was "not empowered to engraft such a [tolling] provision onto the Maryland 
Code, and the facts of this case do not warrant an application of federal equitable 
relief."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). 
245. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1984). 
246. Id (emphasis supplied). There is no restriction within the statutory language of 
this exception that would appear to prohibit expressly or implicitly its application 
to actions under the Act. For the full text of the statute, see supra note 87. The 
Maryland federal district court, however, noted that it will never be applied to 
actions under Rule lOb-5 because of the availability of the comparable federal 
tolling doctrine. O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 (D. Md. 1979), affd, 
625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). 
247. 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981). 
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held that the discovery rule of limitations applies generally to all civil 
actions under state law.248 In sum, despite the statutory limitations, a 
civil cause of action does not accrue in Maryland until the plaintiff 
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the wrong that gave 
rise to his cause of action.249 
No state appellate court has ever decided the relationship or impli-
cation of section 5-203250 or Poffenberger to the limitations set forth in 
section 11-703(f) of the Act. A careful reading of 11-703(f) together 
with these two additional factors suggests that a plaintiff under section 
11-703 of the Act may maintain his action beyond the limitation of 
three years from the date of contract,251 if he can demonstrate that he 
brought his action within one year of the date of discovery of the al-
leged misrepresentation. It remains unclear, however, whether courts 
will stand squarely behind Poffenberger in actions under the Act. In 
any event, an action based upon a misrepresentation in a securities 
transaction under common law theories presently enjoys the protection 
afforded by the discovery rule.252 
Limitations periods in actions for misrepresentations brought 
under federal Rule lOb-5 present a somewhat more complex issue than 
those under the Act. Rule lOb-5 is not governed by any federal statute 
of limitations.253 Federal courts therefore adopt the statute of limita-
tions that aPEly to the state action considered most closely analogous to 
Rule lOb-5. 54 The choice of the state law available to the federal 
courts is usually between the statute of limitations for common law 
248. The Poffenberger court remarked: 
[HJaving already broken the barrier confining the discovery principle to 
professional malpractice, and sensing no valid reason why the rule's 
sweep should not be applied to prevent an injustice in other types of 
cases, we now hold the discovery rule to be applicable generally in all 
actions and the cause of action accrues when the claimant in fact first 
knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong. 
Id at 636, 431 A,2d at 680 (emphasis supplied); see Note, Poffenberger v. Risser-
The Discovery Principle is the Rule, Not the Exception, 41 MD. L. REV. 451 (1982) 
(discussing development of the discovery rule in Maryland). 
249. Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680. 
250. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1984). For the text of this statute, 
see supra note 87. 
251. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text. 
253. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELs,supra note 1, § 2.5(1); 5A A. JACOBS, supra 
note 217, § 235.02 (listing cases and various considerations affecting limitations in 
securities transactions). 
254. The limitations under the Act are identical to those that govern actions under 
section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 (suits under sections II and 12(2) of the 
latter Act must be brought within one year of discovery or when it should have 
been discovered, but in any event within three years of the contract date) and 
sections 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (same). See 
5A A, JACOBS, supra note 217, § 235.02 n.3. Despite a similarity between the fed-
eral and state limitations in securities actions, the state rather than federal provi-
sions will apply. Id § 35.02 nn.5-6. 
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fraud actions or that under the state blue sky act. 255 Although there is 
no uniformity among the federal courts,256 suits brought under Rule 
IOb-5 in Maryland federal district court are governed by section 11-
703(f) of the Act, because the Act more clearly addresses the policy 
purposes of Rule IOb-5 than actions at common law.257 
Two further considerations will affect any federal decision on Rule 
IOb-5 limitations. First, federal courts are bound by the language and 
construction of section 11-703 as it is amended or developed, and are 
not bound by earlier versions or interpretations of its content. In Fox v. 
Kane-Miller Corp. ,258 the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court de-
cision259 to employ the limitations period contained in section 11-703 
prior to its amendment in 1968. The trial court's rationale for this 
choice was that once a federal court had chosen a state limitations pe-
riod for Rule IOb-5 actions, it could not thereafter consider subsequent 
changes in the state limitations period without the risk of moving the 
"federal Rule IOb-5 limitations period up and down like a yo-yo on a 
string."260 The Fourth Circuit rejected this contention, holding that 
federal law and policy considerations mandate that Rule IOb-5 actions 
be governed by the limitations period of the most current analogous 
state law.261 This decision demonstrates that actions in federal courts 
for securities misrepresentations should receive at least the equivalent 
limitations period as found under section 11-703(f). Further, it indi-
cates a flexibility within the federal courts to respond to changes in 
state law. 
In light of Fox, federal courts quite possibly might be persuaded 
to follow Poffenberger 262 in future Rule IOb-5 actions. This possibility 
is unlikely, however, because of the second consideration that affects 
limitations actions under Rule IOb-5. Although state law will govern 
limitations of civil suits under Rule IOb-5, federal law controls when 
the limitations period commences to run.263 Thus, in appropriate cir-
255. See O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 449 u.s. 1124 
(1981). . 
256. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 217 at § 235.02 nn.20-102 and accompanying text. 
257. See O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 17-19 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Fox v. Kane-
Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915, 917-18 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 
(1981)); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975); accord Hill v. Equitable 
Trust Co., 562 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Del. 1983) (Maryland blue sky limitations apply 
to actions under Rule IOb-5). 
258. 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976). 
259. Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1975), affd on other grounds, 
542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976). 
260. Fox, 398 F. Supp. at 641; quoted in Fox, 542 F.2d at 917. 
261. Fox, 542 F.2d at 917-18; see also Boulder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., Nos. 84-152L & 84-1513 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 1984) (claims under the 
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.c. § 6b (1982), and claims for common law 
fraud are controlled by one year limitation in the Act). 
262. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981); see notes 244-52 and 
accompanying text. 
263. See Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing Vanderboom v. 
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cumstances, the federal tolling doctrine264 may be invoked in suits 
under Rule IOb-5. This rule states that limitations "do not begin to run 
until thefraud is either actually known or should have been discovered 
by the exercise of due diligence."26s The federal tolling doctrine is dis-
tinguishable from the Poffenberger rule because the imposition of the 
federal tolling doctrine requires the presence of fraud in the transac-
tion. By contrast, the Poffenberger rule operates whenever the plaintiff 
uses reasonable efforts to discover the wrong alleged, which mayor 
may not include an allegation of fraud. 266 Relief from the statutory 
limitations in section 11-703(t) actions available in Maryland courts 
under Poffenberger therefore may not be available in federal courts, 
absent a showing of fraud related to the securities transaction.267 Be-
cause some form of scienter is a threshold requirement to maintain any 
action under Rule lOb-5,268 however, the federal tolling doctrine ap-
pears to afford adequate flexibility to the issue of limitations in any suit 
brought under the rule. Once the plaintiff establishes scienter in the 
securities transaction, federal courts will examine whether the plaintiff 
used due diligence to discover the misrepresentation. In addition, the 
courts may invoke the federal tolling doctrine in a manner similar to 
the state provision that extends limitations whenever fraud is 
present.269 
V. PENDENT JURISDICTION 
An appreciation of both the availability and prudential character 
of federal pendent jurisdiction is essential in cases that allege misrepre-
sentation in securities transactions because it is the rule, rather than the 
exception, that these transactions will include potential claims under 
Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1970); Maine v. Leonard, 353 F. Supp. 968, 
971 (W.D. Va. 1973». 
264. Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975). 
265. Id (emphasis supplied); see also A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note I, 
§ 2.5( I), at n.107 (listing cases that indicate degree of fraud federal courts have 
found sufficient to invoke tolling doctrine); 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 217, 
§ 235.03 to .04 (discussing interplay between state statutory limitations periods 
and federal law in securities litigation and termination of the federal tolling 
doctrine). 
266. See supra note 248. 
267. In effect, the federal tolling doctrine is identical to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 5-203 (1984). For the text of this provision, see supra note 87. 
268. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text. 
269. Under both the federal tolling doctrine and MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-203 (1984), the presence of any fraud in a transaction is sufficient to trigger the 
exceptions to limitations, and a plaintiff is not required to prove a separate con-
cealment of the cause of action by additional fraudulent acts. Compare Janigan v. 
Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir. 1965) ("[W)here fraud is involved the cause of 
action is, so-to-speak, automatically concealed .... ") with Piper v. Jenkins, 207 
Md. 308, 113 A.2d 919 (1955) (fraud need not be concealed by special additional 
efforts or circumstances). But see O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 (D. 
Md. 1979) (§ 5-203 does not apply to limitations of federal securities laws), 625 
F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). 
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both state and federallaw.270 
Pendent jurisdiction allows federal courts to decide claims arising 
under state law when adjudicating closely related claims under federal 
law.271 The seminal Supreme Court decision on pendent jurisdiction 
is United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs.272 The Gibbs Court held 
that once it has been demonstrated that the federal and state claims are 
derived from a common nucleus of operative fact,"273 involve claims a 
plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try ... all in one judicial 
proceeding,"274 and include a substantial federal issue,275 federal courts 
have jurisdiction over all claims presented. 
Gibbs further held that pendent jurisdiction "is a doctrine of dis-
cretion, not of plaintiffs right."276 In determining whether to grant or 
withhold pendent jurisdiction, a federal court weighs policy considera-
tions such as 'judicial economy, convenience and fairness to liti-
gants,"277 as well as the closeness of the state claim to questions of 
federal policy.278 Considerations militating against the exercise of fed-
eral pendent jurisdiction may include a reluctance to make "needless 
decisions of state law,"279 or the likelihood of jury confusion because of 
presence of divergent legal theories of relief.280 Finally, when the fed-
eral court dismisses federal claims before trial, it should also dismiss 
the state claims.281 
Federal courts do not automatically grant pendent jurisdiction in 
all securities cases. An excellent example of the denial of pendent ju-
risdiction in a securities case is Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Investment Serv-
ices, Inc. 282 The Stowell trial court was presented with claims alleging 
violations of various federal securities laws, Florida's blue sky statute, 
and a count alleging common law fraud.283 In reviewing the theories of 
legal recovery applicable to each of the plaintiffs counts, the court 
noted that under Rule lOb-5, if the jury found that the defendant in-
tended to deceive the plaintiff, it could only award actual or compensa-
270. This comment will emphasize certain considerations concerning federal pendent 
jurisdiction that are relevant to securities transactions cases. For a thorough dis-
cussion of the practical and policy considerations that affect a court's decision to 
grant or withhold federal pendent jurisdiction, see generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 
1040 (1983) (federal pendent jurisdiction over nonfederal claims). 
271. Id 
272. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
273. Id at 725. 
274. Id 
275.ld 
276. Id at 726. 
277. Id 
278. Id at 727. 
279. Id at 726. 
280. Id at 727. 
281. Id at 726. 
282. 489 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1980), ajJ'd on other grounds, 641 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
283. Stowell, 489 F. Supp. at 1211. 
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tory damages.284 Under Florida common law, however, actions in 
fraud may be premised upon negligent conduct, and punitive damages 
may be available.285 The trial court thus felt that the jury would be 
confused by the two divergent legal theories of recovery: although a 
defendant who intentionally defrauds is liable only for actual damages 
under the securities laws, a "less culpable" negligent defendant is sub-
ject to greater liability under the common law because of the availabil-
ity of punitive damages.286 The Stowell court dismissed without 
prejudice the common law count because of the potential for jury con-
fusion.287 The Fourth Circuit has apparently yet to decide this precise 
issue.288 
The Fourth Circuit has almost routinely granted pendent jurisdic-
tion to hear actions based upon facts substantially relating to the same 
securities transaction, in suits that allege violations of federal and state 
securities regulations, and the common law.289 Implicit in these deci-
284.ld at 1214-18. 
285.ld at 1216-18. 
286.ld at 1217 (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 
(1966»; accord Summers v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 380, 383-84 (S.D. 
Fla. 1983). 
287. Stowell, 489 F. Supp. at 1217, 1227. Dismissal based on jury confusion among 
other theories of recovery is analogous to dismissal from jury consideration issues 
deemed to be "too complex." For an overview of decisions on the issue of com-
plexity, see 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 
38.11[10] (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1984); In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 
411 (9th Cir. 1979) (despite likelihood of trial lasting two years and exhibits total-
ing over 100,000 pages, there is no "complexity exception" to the seventh amend-
ment right to jury trial), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). 
At least one Maryland court has already entertained an action for securities 
fraud based upon claims under the Act, common law, and concurrent jurisdiction 
under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 C.F.R. § 77v (1981). Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 
239 Md. 669, 682, 212 A.2d 476, 483 (1965). 
288. Pendent common law counts have been dismissed in cases that allege violations of 
federal securities laws. See Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259-60 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(court upheld dismissal of pendent state claims that sought punitive damages be-
cause Rule IOb-5 was found to provide an adequate basis of relief; court refused 
to decide whether federal policy should control decisions of district courts to try 
pendent state claims for punitive damages in securities cases). Contra Oliver v. 
Bostetter, 426 F. Supp. 1082, 1090 (D. Md. 1977) (in suit under federal securities 
law, pendent state common law counts that included punitive damages upheld 
against motion to dismiss); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 685-87 (D. Md. 
1975) (pendent common law claims that sought punitive damages upheld against 
motion to dismiss, because while actions under Rule IOb-5 alone cannot recover 
punitive damages, these damages may be awarded under a state common law 
claim brought with a Rule IOb-5 claim and are therefore properly before the 
court). See also A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note I, § 2.7(3), at nn.164-
69 and accompanying text (considerations that affect the exercise of federal pen-
dent jurisdiction with a listing of related securities cases). 
289. See, e.g., Gurley v. Documation, Inc., 674 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1982) (lower court 
decision found no cause of action under Rule IOb-5 and hence state claims dis-
missed and remanded for application of federal tolling doctrine); O'Neil v. Marri-
ott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026, 1033-35 (D. Md. 1982) (pendent common law claims 
retained when court dismissed federal securities claims but retained federal ER-
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sions is a recognition that, on balance, the policy considerations articu-
ISA claims); Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors & RGI Holding Co., 
533 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Md. 1982) (court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment as to federal securities and certain common law counts, but retained 
jurisdiction over other counts under the Act and common law); O'Hara v. Kovens, 
473 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1979) (dismissal of federal securities claims required 
dismissal of claims under Act and common law), ajJ'd, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528 (D. Md. 1978) (common law counts upheld against 
defendant's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff also alleged federal 
securities violations); Sasso v. Koehler, 445 F. Supp. 762 (D. Md. 1978) (court 
dismissed federal securities law claims, but retained jurisdiction over federal Re-
negotiation Act claim and common law counts of fraud, conspiracy, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract); Houlihan v. Anderson-
Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1324 (D.D.C. 1977) (dismissal of claims under federal 
securities laws argued for dismissal of pendent state claims); Fox v. Kane-Miller 
Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1975) (common law counts submitted to jury 
with claims under federal and state securities laws), ajJ'd, 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 
1976); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660 (D. Md. 1975) (claims under Rule 
IOb-5 and common law fraud upheld although court dismissed claims under state 
securities act and for common law breach of fiduciary duty). But see Amdur v. 
Lizars, 39 F.R.D. 29 (D. Md. 1965) (no single cause of action found among fed-
eral and state claims that would support pendent jurisdiction). 
Other considerations will bear upon litigation of claims under the Act or 
common law in federal court. First, Maryland courts have never decided whether 
filing a state claim in federal court tolls the limitations of the state claim, and the 
federal district courts assume that it does not provide tolling. See O'Neil v. Mar-
riott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026, 1034-35 (D. Md. 1982) ("The running of the limita-
tions period is tolled by the filing of suit, but there is no indication that Maryland 
courts would hold that filing suit in federal court similarly tolls the running of the 
statute."); accord Sasso v. Koehler, 445 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Md. 1978) ("An 
analysis of Maryland law leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs prior claim [filed 
in another federal district court] did not interrupt the running of limitations [in his 
action filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland]"). 
Second, dismissal of state claims from federal court that were timely filed but 
exceeded the statute of limitations at the date of dismissal (in states, such as Mary-
land, which have no statutory or decisional law on this aspect of tolling) may 
constitute an abuse of judicial discretion. See, e.g., Rheume v. Texas Dept. of 
Pub. Safety, 666 F.2d 925, 931-32 (5th Cir. 1982) (upon remand, district court 
must determine whether pendent state claim is barred by limitations; if pendent 
claim dismissed but state courts refuse to grant jurisdiction because of limitations, 
then district court should grant rehearing to reconsider question of pendent juris-
diction); Pharo v. Smith, 625 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal courts 
should retain pendent jurisdiction over state claims when there is a substantial 
possibility that the state claim is barred in state court); O'Brien v. Continental Ill. 
Nat'l Bank & Trust, 593 F.2d 54, 63-65 (7th Cir. 1979) (after district court dis-
missed substantial federal claim under Rule IOb-5, dismissal of time-barred pen-
dent state claims constitutes an abuse of discretion); Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 
238, 244 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (after court dismisses claims under federal securities 
acts, it may dismiss state claims not barred by limitations). For an example where 
the plaintiffs initial choice of forum later restricted his recourse to federal courts, 
see Amdur v. Lizars, 39 F.R.D. 29 (D. Md. 1965) (plaintiff initially filed state 
claims for misrepresentation in securities transaction in state court; claim under 
Rule IOb-5 later added to state claims and filed in federal court; federal court 
stayed decision on state claims until they were litigated in state court; federal 
court reluctant to allow plaintiff to move his claims to a federal forum when sole 
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lated in Gibbs290 favor granting pendent jurisdiction over state blue sky 
and common law claims when the plaintiff also alleges violations of 
federal securities laws. 
The potential for jury confusion that prompted the Stowell court 
to dismiss the pendent common law claim presents an interesting policy 
argument. In Stowell, the court felt that the perceived confusion could 
not be overcome by careful jury instructions.291 Although many other 
courts have not found this potential for confusion sufficient to warrant 
discussion, let alone dismissal, it does not necessarily mean that the 
Stowell court arrived at an invalid conclusion.292 Dismissal, however, 
is not the only judicial response available when a party raises the issue 
of jury confusion. 
For example, in Fox v. Kane-MIller Corp. ,293 the plaintiff brought 
claims under the federal and Maryland securities acts and for common 
law fraud,294 Rather than applying a Stowell-type analysis and dis-
missing the common law count as possibly confusing, the court handled 
the presence of multiple legal theories of recovery by isolating the ele-
ments under each count into fifty-two discrete questions that the jury 
answered individually.295 Using this verdict format, the Fox court was 
able to minimize the effect of any confusion that might have resulted 
from the divergent theories of recovery.296 In addition, this technique 
represents an implicit recognition that the policies of "judicial econ-
omy, convenience and fairness to litigants"297 were best served by 
granting federal pendent jurisdiction over all state claims in this securi-
ties case.298 The Maryland federal district court should continue this 
reason was for plaintiff to avoid posting a security bond directed by the state 
court). 
290. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966); 
supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text. 
291. Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 1980), 
o/.f'd on other grounds, 641 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1981). 
292. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). 
293. 398 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1975), o/.f'd, 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976). 
294. Fox, 398 F. Supp. at 614. 
295. Id at 630-31, 641 n.26, 642 n.28. 
296. Although it is arguable that 52 special questions may generate jury confusion be-
cause of the volume of issues the jury must consider, the Gibbs Court did not 
indicate that jury confusion through mere volume or complexity of evidence, or a 
large number of certified questions, are sufficient reasons to deny pendent juris-
diction. Indeed, Gibbs noted that the possibility of jury confusion may be less-
ened by resort to a special verdict form. United Mine Workers of America v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1965). In addition, greater complexity of evidence is not 
a sufficient ground to deny a seventh amendment right to jury trial. In re United 
States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 
(1980). Some amount of jury confusion, however, is inevitable in any jury trial. 
Indeed, the Fox court found that some jury confusion arose but was able to over-
come it by careful examination of the certified answers returned by the jury. See 
supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text. 
297. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1965). 
298. It would appear to be judicially uneconomical, inconvenient, and inequitable to 
litigants to require them to pursue two actions, in two different court systems, 
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approach, at least until the Court of Appeals of Maryland decides 
whether state limitations are tolled by filing in federal court, under the 
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the general similarity between section 11-703 of the Act 
and federal Rule lOb-5, litigants must weigh several distinctions and 
considerations prior to deciding which claims to file. For plaintiffs, the 
foremost issue is their ability to prove scienter. Absent scienter, courts 
will dismiss any suit under Rule lOb-5, with the probable subsequent 
dismissal of any pendent state claims. In addition, timely filing of an 
action in which scienter is absent will not trigger the federal tolling 
doctrine. Claims under section 11-703, however, need not include an 
allegation of scienter, and the Po.ffenberger discovery rule does not re-
quire fraud to extend limitations under the Act. 
Although federal pendent jurisdiction is not automatically assured 
for any state claims because of the possibility of the ')ury confusion" 
issue, the Fourth Circuit has indicated a willingness to grant it in the 
majority of securities cases. Actions under common law theories of de-
ceit or negligent misrepresentation remain viable separate actions at 
the state level or as additional counts in a federal forum, and offer the 
possibility of recovering punitive damages. Overall, the narrowing of 
remedies under Rule lOb-5 should be balanced against the relative un-
familiarity of the state courts with claims brought under the Act. The 
differences among the common law and statutory schemes of remedy 
for misrepresentation in securities transactions provide the practitioner 
with a wealth of choices and alternatives that virtually assure that a 
cause of action may be found and pursued at either the state or federal 
leve1. 
Robert L. Humphreys, Jr. 
potentially under two separate appellate systems, and force them to suffer the in-
creased burdens of cost, delay, and appeals for actions that stem from substan-
tially one separate set of facts. 
